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Populism and nationalism are key drivers of current international
economic relations, affecting almost all aspects of foreign economic policy. 
After almost four decades of cooperation in international financial relations,
recent events suggest that we are now potentially entering a new phase of
progressive disengagement. This new era would be dominated by the explicit
need to safeguard domestic interests, in which regulatory barriers to cross-
border finance will be more pronounced and curtailing the expansion of 
global financial markets will no longer be considered a policy taboo. This 
Article presents a brief history of financial nationalism and discusses some 
of its more recent phenomena around the world, from the regulatory 
conflicts between the European Union and the United Kingdom over the 
control of the European derivatives clearing market, to the attacks on central 
banks’ independence, or the open distrust of western regulators against the 
Chinese FinTech giants. In contrast to other phenomena of economic 
populism, like trade protectionism, it is very difficult to theorize a single 
explanation behind this new protectionist push. Financial nationalism is 
neither an economic ideology nor a structured response to the downsides of
economic globalization. More simply, it is the manifestation of a multiplicity 
of policy needs, which invariably lead to a reconfiguration of the inherent 
regulatory tradeoff between the protection of national sovereignty and the 
expansion of global markets; this time favoring the former.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Nationalism is a key concept in contemporary international relations. 
After decades during which nationalism nearly disappeared from the
vocabulary of mainstream western politics and was instead used only by a 
small fringe of extreme parties and a handful of populist dictators, it has now 
reoccupied the central stage of the political debate. The United Kingdom’s 
decision to leave the European Union, U.S. President Donald Trump’s 
immigration and protectionist trade policies, the rise of anti-Euro political 
parties in continental Europe, China’s confrontational maritime policy in the 
South China Sea, and Brazil’s 2018 turbulent elections, can all be explained 
by a sincere desire to reinstate national interest as the guiding principle of 
domestic and foreign economic policy. While nationalism is mostly 
associated with border and ethnic wars, an isolationist foreign policy, or 
tougher immigration controls, it nonetheless plays a fundamental role in
international economic relations.1  In this context, most of the discussion on
economic nationalism focuses on trade policy, where barriers to trade are 
more visibly disruptive.2 On the contrary, very little has been written so far
1. See generally Erns B. Haas, What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study it?, 40 INT’L ORG. 
707 (1986) (discussing various conceptions of nationalism). 
2. See, e.g., Dani Rodrik, Is Populism Necessarily Bad Economics?, 108 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 
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on the recent rise of populism and nationalism in international finance.3 The 
goal of this Article is to investigate this phenomenon. 
Over the last fifty years, financial integration has progressed at a steady 
pace, spurred on by the 1970s shift towards a flexible exchange rate regime,
the increased need of cheap sources of capital, the desire for better 
investment opportunities, and financial innovations.4 Since the creation of 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 1975, the process of 
financial integration has been accompanied by a progressive, albeit slow and 
patchy, trend towards increased regulatory and supervisory cooperation.5 
The work of the various transnational regulatory networks (TRNs) in finance
never reached the level of legal cooperation seen in other areas of
international economic policy, notably because of the lack of a hard legal
framework. Nonetheless, it worked to create an institutional architecture for
finance that at least strived for increased international convergence.6 Indeed, 
despite the inherent weakness of the soft international law of finance, 
institutional, and market pressures on regulators were such that a minimum 
level of international coordination was often the only option for a country
with an open financial system.7 Not surprisingly, the period between 1975
and 2014 saw a steady increase in international standards and guidelines in 
virtually all aspects of financial policymaking, from anti-money laundering 
to banking supervision, derivatives trading, financial inclusion, and even 
cryptocurrencies.8 
196, 196–97 (2018) (“[I]n economics, populists reject restraints on the conduct of economic policy. 
Autonomous regulatory agencies, independent central banks, and external constraints (such as global 
trade rules) narrow their policy options and hence need to be overcome.”); Dani Rodrik, Populism and 
the Economics of Globalization, 1 J. INT’L BUS. & POL’Y 12, 13–14 (2018).
3. Recent publications since 2016 include Charles Goodhart & Rosa Lastra, Populism and Central 
Bank Independence, 29 OPEN ECON. REV. 49 (2018); Rodrik, Populism and the Economics of 
Globalization, supra note 2.
4. Int’l Monetary Fund [IMF], Understanding Financial Interconnectedness (Oct. 2010), 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Understanding-Financial-
Interconnectedness-PP4503. See also RAWI ABDELAL, CAPITAL RULES: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL 
FINANCE 7–9 (2007) (discussing liberalized capital flows during the 1970s and the effect of the flexible
exchange rate regime and other financial innovations on financial internationalization). For a broader 
history of financial globalization, see BARRY EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL: A HISTORY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 6–43 (2d ed. 2008).
5. On the rise of international cooperation in financial regulation, see CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT 
LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 2015).
 6. See generally  FEDERICO LUPO-PASINI, THE LOGIC OF FINANCIAL NATIONALISM: THE 
CHALLENGES OF COOPERATION AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2017) (discussing the 
successes and failures of various international law regimes in protecting financial sovereignty).
 7. See  BRUMMER, supra note 5, at 115–77. For a more formal explanation of the pressure for 
cooperation, see generally DAVID ANDREW SINGER, REGULATING CAPITAL: SETTING STANDARDS FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2007). 
8. For a list of all standards and guidelines in finance, see Key Standards for Sound Financial 
LUPO-PASINI FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/20/2019 12:31 PM     
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Yet recent events suggest an opposite trend in global financial 
policymaking towards a more nationalist approach and less regulatory 
coordination. First of all, since 2010, there has been increasing evidence of
a slowdown in the level and pace of financial integration, especially in cross-
border banking.9 Recent research suggests that we are progressively moving 
from a very integrated global financial system towards a system of regional
financial integration in which the perimeters of international markets are 
sensibly reduced.10 This regulatory trend is the focus of this study.
Just to mention a few key developments: since 2016, the United States, 
the European Union, and the United Kingdom have been entrenched in 
parallel regulatory wars on the regulation of derivatives clearing and the 
reform of Basel III.11 Various jurisdictions around the world have openly 
moved to a mode of cross-border banking supervision based on 
subsidiarization and ring-fencing that substantially reduces financial 
integration.12  In various jurisdictions, a new wave of digital protectionism
directly affects the expansion and global operation of FinTech firms, banks, 
and financial institutions.13 In the United States, the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. financial laws is increasingly used as an instrument of 
lawfare to advance broader foreign policy objectives. Finally, central banks
are increasingly attacked in various countries by politicians for not
Systems, Fin. Stability Bd., http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/about-the-compendium-of-standards/key_
standards/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
9. See Stjin Claessens & Neeltje van Horen, The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Banking 
Globalization, 63 IMF ECON. REV. 868, 870–72 (2015) (discussing the evolution of financial 
globalization after the global financial crisis, noting a well-documented “collapse in capital flows and
signs of financial fragmentation”); Sebastian Mallaby, Globalization Resets: The Retrenchment in Cross-
Border Capital Flows and Trade May Be Less Dire than it Seems, 53 FIN. & DEV. 6, 7 (2016); Roland 
Beck et al., The Side Effects of National Financial Sector Policies: Framing the Debate on Financial 
Protectionism, 9 EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK [ECB], (Occasional Paper No. 166, 2015); Eugenio Cerutti 
& Haonan Zhou, The Global Banking Network in the Aftermath of the Crisis: Is There Evidence of De-
Globalization? 35–36 (IMF, Working Paper WP/17/232, 2017); Robert McCauley et al., Financial 
Deglobalisation in Banking? 1 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 650, 2017).
 10. Eugenio Cerutti & Haonan Zhou, The Global Banking Network: What is Behind the Increasing
Regionalization Trend? 37–39 (IMF, Working Paper WP/18/46, 2018).
11. Caroline Binham & Emma Dunkley, Basel Postpones Bank Reform Vote Amid Policy 
Differences, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/589f1ce0-d1a1-11e6-9341-
7393bb2e1b51.
 12. Wilson Ervin, Understanding ‘Ring-Fencing’ and How it Could Make Banking Riskier, 
BROOKINGS (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/understanding-ring-fencing-and-how-
it-could-make-banking-riskier.
13. See, e.g., Trump’s Trade War Scores Hat-Trick, Affecting Incumbents, Fintechs and Crypto!, 
FINTECH TIMES, (May 10, 2019), https://thefintechtimes.com/trade-incumbents-fintechs (discussing 
FinTech in the United States); Yuan Yang, Trade War with US Delays China’s Rules Curbing Data 
Transfers, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/c8f4b066-60df-11e9-b285-
3acd5d43599e (discussing FinTech in China).
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submitting to their political and economic agenda.14 
All these events clearly signal a change in the attitude of governments 
towards less global financial cooperation and more national control. It is too 
early to gauge the real extent of this trend, whether it is merely a temporary
phenomenon due to external political events or a more substantial shift 
towards de-globalization. This study will investigate the rise of financial
nationalism in contemporary international financial policy and analyze the 
reasons behind this phenomenon. This Article will demonstrate that the 
recent nationalist trend is, in large part, not the result of mere populist 
rhetoric, but, rather, the consequence of global political economy dynamics 
favoring different distributional trade-offs. To clarify this argument, this 
Article will be structured as follows: Part II will introduce the main theories 
of nationalism and economic populism, with a specific focus on financial 
populism. Part III will give a brief historical overview of financial 
nationalism over the last five centuries. Parts IV and V will discuss the recent
examples of financial nationalism and attempt to contextualize them within
the political economy and political science literature on international 
cooperation.
II. THEORIES OF NATIONALISM
Nationalism is a well-discussed phenomenon in political science 
literature.15 Without delving into the huge amount of work on the topic,
nationalism broadly refers to the idea that the interests of the state and the 
entities or individuals associated with it, be those corporations, citizens, or
public agencies, should prevail over those of foreigners. As such, 
nationalism is a relational concept that requires international context where 
states must live and operate alongside each other. In this light, it is important 
to distinguish nationalism from patriotism. Both are relational concepts that 
entail a competition between two identical interests and the sacrifice of one 
of them. However, while the former envisages a trade-off between national 
14. The Independence of Central Banks is Under Threat from Politics, ECONOMIST (Apr. 13, 2019), 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/04/13/the-independence-of-central-banks-is-under-threat-
from-politics. 
15. For an overview of the literature, see generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED 
COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (3rd ed. 2006); ERNEST
GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983); DUDLEY SEERS, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
NATIONALISM (1983); ANTHONY D. S. SMITH, NATIONALISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1979);
ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD (Eric Helleiner & Andreas Pickel eds., 2005); 
George T. Crane, Economic Nationalism: Bringing the Nation Back In, 27 MILLENNIUM J. INT’L STUD.
55 (1998); Anthony A.P. D’Costa, Economic Nationalism in Motion: Steel, Auto, and Software Industries 
in India, 16 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 620 (2009); Haas, supra note 1, at 2; Adam Harmes, The Rise of 
Neoliberal Nationalism, 19 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 59 (2012); Stephen Shulman, National Sources of 
International Economic Integration, 44 INT’L STUD. Q. 365 (2000).
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and foreign interests and the primacy of the nationals’, the latter sees a 
competition between the interests of the individual and those of the state, and 
the sacrifice of the individuals’ interests for the general good of the nation.16 
Nationalism can express itself in many ways. The most visible forms
can include intolerance or violence against foreign individuals and
migrants17 or an aggressive military policy to protect or conquer foreign 
territories considered as belonging culturally, ethnically, or geographically 
to the state.18 But nationalism can also express itself through the subtler 
disregard of international legal obligations—for instance, the unwillingness 
to comply with an international court’s ruling or strategic violations of key
international legal obligations.19 Nationalism can also manifest itself in
economic relations. 
A. Economic Nationalism in Political Science 
Economic nationalism is part of the broader area of international
relations. In this context, economic nationalism is best understood as a 
general policy attitude giving prevalence to national goals whenever these 
are in conflict with international objectives and promoting the autonomy and 
unity of a nation from an economic and financial viewpoint.20  In a very 
famous definition, Robert Gilpin described it as the “central idea . . . that 
economic activities are and should be subordinate to the goal of state 
building and the interests of the state.”21 
It is easy to equate economic nationalism with economic populism. The 
two political approaches often go hand-in-hand, as the populist rhetoric 
oftentimes implies a general aversion to “the enemies of the people,” be they
financial elites, foreigners, or minorities. We had many examples of this kind 
16. Ben Clift & Cornelia Woll, Economic Patriotism: Reinventing Control Over Open Markets, 19 
J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 307, 308 (2012).
 17. David Cole, The Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants’ Rights, 37 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 627, 630 (2006); Chaim Gans, Nationalism and Immigration, 1 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL 
PRAC. 159, 169 (1998); Claudia Postelnicescu, Europe’s New Identity: The Refugee Crisis and the Rise 
of Nationalism, 12 EUR. J. PSYCH. 203, 203 (2016).
18. On the relationship between nationalism and war, see BROWN ET AL., NATIONALISM AND
ETHNIC CONFLICT (rev. ed., 2001). See generally JOHN HUTCHINSON, NATIONALISM AND WAR (2017).
19. The quintessential example in this regard is China’s refusal to comply with the international 
law of the sea with regard to its claims on the South China Sea. See Eric A. Posner & John Yoo,
International Law and the Rise of China, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2006); Harriet Moynihan, China’s Evolving
Approach to International Dispute Settlement, CHATAM HOUSE (Mar. 29, 2017),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/chinas-evolving-approach-international-dispute-settlement 
(discussing China’s ambiguous attitude towards international dispute settlement and how it relates to
Chinese nationalism).
 20. Shulman, supra note 15, at 368.
 21. ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 31 (1987).
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throughout history. With the exception of Chile under Pinochet, most Latin
American countries, from the 1930s well into the 1980s, adopted very strict
controls on foreign direct and portfolio investments and limited their 
international economic engagement.22 The Calvo doctrine prevented foreign
investors from seeking legal remedies outside national courts, thus giving 
host states the upper hand in investment disputes.23 
Historically, economic nationalism manifested itself in trade policy 
through the adoption of import-substituting industrial policies and higher
trade barriers.24 Protectionism is a trade phenomenon and a trade policy 
concept, although it sometimes refers to other non-strictly-trade policies. It 
defines the practice of restricting imports from other countries in order to
protect domestic industries.25 This is achieved by various methods, from 
increased import duties or quotas to restrictive and discriminatory domestic
regulations, subsidies for local firms, and discriminatory administrative
practices. The ultimate goal is to protect local industries from the 
competition of foreign firms, often giving rise to trade wars. More recently, 
in the international trade arena, the rise of protectionist policies in the form
of higher tariff barriers was justified by President Trump as the need to 
protect the local manufacturing industry.26 Studies suggest that this trend in 
international economic policy will not reverse anytime soon, as it reflects a 
deeper malaise of economic globalization that has been unable to effectively
price the trade adjustment costs associated with free trade. In the
background, there is also a looming long-term economic shift in the 
leadership of technology development between the United States and China. 
In its worse form, economic nationalism sees the full rejection of 
globalization and a total reduction of the perimeter of the market at the
22. See CAPITAL FLOWS, CAPITAL CONTROLS, AND CURRENCY CRISES: LATIN AMERICA IN THE
1990S 1 (Felipe Larrain ed., 2000) (stating that Latin American experienced “a decade of almost complete
financial isolation from world private markets” in the 1980s); Sebastian Edwards, Capital Flows, Real 
Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls: Some Latin American Experiences 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 6800, 1998) (stating that “[d]uring the 1960s and early 1970s Latin 
America was basically cut off from international financial markets”).
23. The Calvo Doctrine argues that jurisdiction to settle disputes between foreign investors and 
host states lies in the place where the investment is located. Thus, the doctrine proposed to deny foreign 
investors the right to sue the host state in their own national courts or international tribunals. Patrick
Juillard, Calvo Doctrine/Calvo Clause, in  MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2010). 
24. Robert Baldwin, The Political Economy of Protectionism, in  IMPORT COMPETITION AND
RESPONSE 263, 263–92 (Jagdish Bhagwati ed., 1982). 
25. Id.
 26. Douglas Irwin, The False Promise of Protectionism: Why Trump’s Trade Policy Could 
Backfire, 96 FOREIGN AFF. 45 (2017); Deborah Elms & Bhargav Sriganesh, Trump’s Trade Policy: 
Discerning Between Rhetoric and Reality, 12 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 247, 249 
(2017).
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national level. This often results in the adoption of a number of policies, 
which can include widespread nationalizations and the creation of state
monopolies, repatriation of foreign staff, violation of foreign-owned
intellectual property rights, import-substituting industrial policies, self-
sufficient agricultural policies, and a general closure of the capital account.27 
Examples in this regard unfortunately abound, from the nationalizations of
foreign investments under Hugo Chavez in Venezuela to the creation of 
strong state monopolies and the concentration of key industries in national
hands in Putin’s Russia as a reaction to the post-Soviet liberalizations in the
1990s.28 
Most of the time, economic nationalism entails a retrenchment of the 
state along national lines. However, economic nationalism does not 
necessarily equate to full economic autarchy. More often, it is simply
opposed to allowing global markets to exclusively determine the economic 
destiny of the nation.29 Sometimes economic nationalist politicians will
champion a national version of liberal or neoliberal policies that nonetheless 
entails the protection of national interests.30 Thus, even though decision 
makers identify themselves as liberals, with all that this label carries in terms 
of market liberalization, state intervention in the economy, and rule of law, 
they nonetheless favor economic policies that protect the respect of national 
identities or national autonomy, or that promote the nation, its citizens, and 
its firms as a sovereign community.31 For instance, politicians might favor
mergers between national firms, rather than allowing a foreign take-over. In
other circumstances, they might subsidize the international expansion of 
national companies or adopt policies that are specifically aimed at distorting 
markets to incentivize exports. They might favor a foreign direct investment 
model based on joint ventures with locals, rather than full liberalization with 
27. NIGEL HARRIS, NATIONAL LIBERATION 348 (1990).
 28. Rawi Abdelal, Nationalism and International Political Economy in Eurasia, in  ECONOMIC
NATIONALISM IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 21–43 (Eric Helleiner & Andreas Pickel eds., 2005). See 
generally  RAWI ABDELAL, NATIONAL PURPOSE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: POST-SOVIET STATES IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2001) (discussing the role of nationalism in post-Soviet international
economic strategies).
 29. Sam Pryke, Economic Nationalism: Theory, History, and Prospects, 3 GLOBAL POL’Y 281, 285 
(2012).
30. For further discussion, see generally ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD, 
supra note 15; Harmes, supra note 15; Rodrik, Is Populism Necessarily Bad Economics?, supra note 2; 
Rodrik, Populism and the Economics of Globalization, supra note 2. On financial patriotism, see Glenn
Morgan, Supporting the City: Economic Patriotism in Financial Markets, 19 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 373
(2012).
 31. See, e.g., Juliet Johnson & Andrew Barnes, Financial Nationalism and Its International 
Enablers: The Hungarian Experience, 22 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 538 (2015) (discussing Hungary’s
recent use of liberal economics to further national autonomy).
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the hope to extract as much benefit as possible for the development of the
local economy. None of those policies is based on the refusal of free trade,
but quite the opposite: they embrace the opportunities of global markets for 
pure national gain.32 
B. Financial Nationalism in a Nutshell 
Financial nationalism is the manifestation of this same protectionist
approach in the financial and monetary policy spheres. However, it takes a 
very different form than pure trade barriers. From a political economy
perspective, a country has no political incentive to liberalize trade, unless its 
market access concessions are reciprocated by other countries.33 Indeed, 
unilateral trade liberalization increases pressure on domestic industries, but 
without the export gains that make the overall deal appealing.  In finance, on
the contrary, unilateral liberalization is always an optimal policy, as reduced 
controls will pull capital from other countries.34 Thus, while trade 
protectionism plays a role in the context of reciprocal market access
concessions, by drawing a clear line between the import-competing 
industries in favor of protection and the domestic consumer and export 
interest groups in favor of liberalization, the same does not apply to trade in
capital. In finance, the dividing line between legitimate policies and
economically unjustified protectionist interventions or discrimination is 
blurry, as there is no need to protect domestic money over foreign money.
Global finance is less interested in the reciprocal market access dynamics 
and much more focused on controlling and managing cross-border financial 
flows. In this context, the objective of financial nationalism is mostly to 
insulate the country from the bargaining and political power given to foreign 
investors, international organizations, or firms or to protect the country from 
a situation of financial distress.
Financial nationalism can be defined as the set of policies, rules, and
administrative decisions that governments and regulatory agencies make to
maintain the control of the national financial and monetary system, with the 
objective of insulating it from foreign political or economic forces. This 
phenomenon can manifest itself in various forms, from the adoption of 
controls on the flow of capital to localization requirements for FinTech firms.
However, as shown in Part IV, financial nationalism typically takes key
forms. The most typical phenomenon is the embrace of monetary
32.  Clift & Woll, supra note 16, at 308.
 33. BERNARD HOEKMAN & MICHAEL KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM: THE WTO AND BEYOND 38–40 (2009).
34. Frances Rosenbluth & Ross Schaap, The Domestic Politics of Globalization, 57 INT’L ORG.
307, 334 (2003).
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sovereignty as the guiding principle of economic policy. Nationalists want 
monetary sovereignty, since it is the prerequisite for full national control on 
the economy.35 Monetary sovereignty does not mean only the full rejection 
of international monetary arrangements and the adoption of a national 
currency, but it can also entail a policy of currency internationalization as a
sign of political strength and as an instrument of geopolitics.36 This is
particularly visible, for instance, in the competition between the United 
States, the European Union, and China over the status of their national 
currency as the leading global reserve currency.
Another classic example of financial nationalism is the adoption of 
capital and currency controls to insulate the country from speculation or
foreign financial pressure, and not necessarily focusing only on speculative
portfolio flows. In the worst cases, capital controls are accompanied by
broader nationalizations of enterprises and debt repudiation, as in the recent
case of Venezuela.37 This is often accompanied by attacks against 
international organizations, typically the International Monetary Fund, or 
“foreign powers” accused of plotting against the defaulting state. Another 
form is financial repression, namely the obligation of citizens to buy portions
of the national debt stock to reduce the dependency of the country on foreign
credit and, therefore, to free themselves from the economic pressure coming
from external interest groups. Finally, financial nationalism typically
manifests itself in increased distrust or a full-front political attack against 
independent agencies, usually the central bank, which are seen as advocating 
the interests of the international community, rather those of their own 
governments. 
Like other versions of nationalism, financial nationalism is not free 
from risks. In an interdependent global economic system, the retrenchment 
of finance along national lines comes with substantial costs. The literature 
on financial globalization, albeit clear on the economic stability risks that
come with financial interdependence, it is nonetheless unequivocal on the 
benefits that an open financial system brings in terms of better access to 
credit and investment opportunities.38 Yet, as demonstrated in a previous
35. See generally NATION-STATES AND MONEY: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF NATIONAL
CURRENCIES (Emily Gilbert & Eric Helleiner eds., 1999) (discussing the history and contemporary 
challenges of national currencies). 
36. See generally  BARRY EICHENGREEN ET AL., HOW GLOBAL CURRENCIES WORK: PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE (2017) (discussing the history and contemporary challenges of global currencies).
 37. Factbox: Venezuela’s Nationalizations under Chavez, REUTERS (Oct. 8, 2012).
38. For an overview of such literature, see Robert G. King & Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: 
Schumpeter Might be Right, 108 Q. J. ECON. (1993); Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic 
Growth: Views and Agenda, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 688 (1997); Laura Alfaro et al., Foreign Bank Entry and 
Entrepreneurship (Oct. 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Columbia University). 
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study, the greatest risks are not faced by those states that decide to reduce 
their level of financial interdependence, but by those that, while maintaining 
a very open and globally integrated financial system, decide to reduce 
regulatory cooperation.39 In an interconnected financial system in which the
perimeter of markets is global but policy is national, regulatory divergence 
reduces the benefits of economic integration and, crucially, increases the risk 
of instability. This latter scenario forms the object of this study.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FINANCIAL AUTARCHY 
Restricting the freedom to lend, invest, and move currency is scarcely 
a new idea. Just like trade protectionism, financial nationalism has existed in 
one form or another since ancient times.40 Both policies are, effectively, two 
sides of the same coin and are indeed very often adopted together. This 
section will provide a historical overview of financial nationalism since the 
birth of modern finance. 
A. Renaissance to Gold Standard 
The period between the Renaissance and the demise of the Gold 
Standard stretches across five centuries of financial innovations, from 
double-entry bookkeeping to the rise of modern capital markets.41 In this
period, international finance grew from being a service mostly in support of 
wars and expeditions to a widespread industry able to cater to the needs of 
firms, states, and individuals. 
Until the late industrial revolution cross-border flows were more 
limited, as finance relied mostly on local capital, except perhaps for the
financing of wars or large expeditions. Yet there are still some examples of 
financial nationalism during this period. Exchange controls were a 
fundamental aspect of ancient mercantilist policies needed to maintain a 
positive trade balance against foreign states. In Discourse of the Common
Wealth of this Realm of England, a sixteenth-century treatise on economic 
policy, the author urged the English to “. . . always take heed that we buy no 
more from strangers than we sell them, for so should we impoverish
ourselves and enrich them.”42 To do so, the export of gold and other means 
39. See generally  LUPO-PASINI, supra note 6 (discussing the successes and failures of various 
international law regimes in protecting financial sovereignty). 
40. See generally  PAUL EINZIG, THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE (1970) (discussing the 
history of foreign exchange and financial nationalism). 
41. On the history of finance, see WILLIAM GOETZMANN, MONEY CHANGES EVERYTHING: HOW
FINANCE MADE CIVILIZATION POSSIBLE (2016).
 42. W.S., DISCOURSE OF THE COMMON WEAL OF THIS REALM OF ENGLAND 63 (Elizabeth Lamond
ed., 1581), https://archive.org/details/discourseofcommo00lamouoft/page/n5. 
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of payment was often discouraged, if not prohibited.43 Modern trade policy 
is the very opposite of mercantilism, but we can nonetheless see that capital
controls are still used in the context of a balance of payments crisis. When 
national reserves are scarce, countries often resort to the imposition of 
exchange controls to minimize the outflow of scarce currency.44 For
instance, General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) Article XV:5 and
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Article XII:1 of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements allow Members to impose
restrictions on the movement of capital and on currency to prevent or to 
impede a monetary crisis.45 
The history of sovereign debt similarly presents a very long list of 
clashes between debtor states and foreign banks, usually followed by periods 
of financial autarchy and a litany of national revindications.46 In one of the
best historical accounts on sovereign defaults, Reinhart and Rogoff show that 
even in the Middle Ages, European states such as England, Spain, and France
had a habit of defaulting on their debt against domestic and foreign creditors
who were often forced into bankruptcy, if not sentenced to death.47 Although
sovereign defaults were often the result of a mix of bad domestic policies
and adverse market conditions, they almost always culminated in a barrage
of financial protectionist policies, such as the suspension of outstanding
payments to foreign creditors, currency controls, and sometimes creeping
expropriations. Inevitably, the position of financial autarchy was often 
imposed upon the sovereign by the markets, which refused to lend to a 
defaulting creditor.
The early Industrial Revolution period lasting until the repeal of the 
Corn Law in 1847 England—the very first seismic change in modern
international economic policy—features very limited cross-border financial 
43. William R. Allen, Mercantilism, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 455 
(John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987). 
44. Isaiah Frank, Import Quotas, the Balance of Payments and the GATT, 10 WORLD ECON. 307, 
307–18 (1987).
45. Gary Horlick & Martin Dubeck, Article XII, in 5 WTO – TRADE IN GOODS, MAX PLANCK 
COMMENTARIES ON WORLD TRADE LAW 306 (Rolf Wolfrum et al. eds., 2008); Deborah E. Siegel, Legal
Aspects of the IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund’s Articles of Agreement and the WTO Agreements, 96 
AM. J. INT’L L. 561, 561–62 (2002); Chantal Thomas, Balance-of-Payments Crises in the Developing 
World: Balancing Trade, Finance and Development in the New Economic Order, 15 AM. U. L. REV. 
1249, 1255 (2000).
 46. See generally  CARMENT REINHART & KENNETH ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLIERS (2011) (discussing historical examples of government debt leading
to financial crisis); MICHAEL WAIBEL, SOVEREIGN DEFAULTS IN FRONT OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS (2012) (discussing the ways in which international tribunals balance sovereign capacity 
to pay against creditor claims).
47. Carmen Reinhart et al., Debt Intolerance, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 11
(2003).
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flows. This considerably reduced the scope of financial protectionist 
policies. However, the period between the second half of the nineteenth 
century and the first three decades of the twentieth century featured an 
unprecedented level of economic integration. The decision of European
states and the United States to link their currency to gold—the so-called Gold 
Standard—gave impetus to international trade.48 The great European powers, 
namely England, Germany, and France, engaged substantially in export
activities towards the new world, which, in turn, fueled a parallel process of
financial development.49 England’s cross-border lending rose from two to
eight percent of gross domestic product, while the stock of foreign assets
held by English investors rose to eighteen billion pounds.50 The Gold 
Standard era, for the first time, featured limited financial protectionism. 
Capital controls were extremely rare, as monetary authorities had the goal of 
maintaining capital mobility, and there were few restrictions on foreign 
investments in the domestic economy.51 
B. Bretton Woods to 1974
It was not until the first part of the twentieth century that financial 
protectionism became an active policy tool in the armory of central banks 
and treasuries. The Wall Street crash of 1929 triggered a debt crisis in
Germany and eastern European states that led to the dismantling of the Gold 
Standard and the imposition of capital controls, exchange restrictions, and 
competitive devaluation in most European states.52 In this complex 
environment plagued by war and the collapse of free trade, only the United
States maintained an open approach to financial globalization. The United
States believed that capital and exchange controls were inherently negative 
and worthy of totalitarian states.53 Up until then, financial nationalism had
not had any particular moral or theoretical underpinning. Restrictions on
capital and currency mostly served to complement trade protectionist
48. See EICHENGREEN, supra note 4, at 6–43.
 49. See generally  HERBERT FEIS, EUROPE: THE WORLD BANKER 1870-1914 (1965) (discussing 
European foreign investment in the nineteenth century); CHARLES HOBSON, THE EXPORT OF CAPITAL
(1914) (discussing the history and growth of foreign investment); Matthew Simon, The Pattern of New
British Portfolio Foreign Investment, 1865–1914, in THE EXPORT OF CAPITAL FROM BRITAIN 15 (A.R.
Hall ed., 1968) (discussing pre-1914 British international capital movements and their political and social
repercussions in more recent world politics).
50. Atish R. Ghosh & Mahvash S. Qureshi, What’s in a Name? That Which We Call Capital 
Controls 7 (IMF, Working Paper WP/16/25, 2016).
 51. Id.
 52. Id.
 53. Id. at 14. See generally  ARTHUR BLOOMFIELD, CAPITAL IMPORTS AND THE AMERICAN
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 1934-39 (1950) (discussing the intricacies of the United States’ international 
finance policies between Worlds Wars).
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policies or to maintain economic stability. Hence, they were the by-product 
of other and more contentious economic policies that were at the epicenter 
of the economic debate. 
The second phase of financial protectionism, paradoxically, starts when 
the conditions for the rebound of economic globalization returned at the end
of World War II. It was in this period that financial protectionism became an
ideological choice. As John Maynard Keynes put it, the “control of capital
movements, both inward and outward, should be a permanent feature of the 
post-war system.”54 Harry Dexter White, the other architect of the Bretton 
Woods monetary system together with Keynes, was opposed to free capital 
mobility on pure economic grounds.55 He believed that it would allow 
countries to set the interest rate independently and therefore to conduct 
monetary and economic policy autonomously.56 Their views fundamentally
shaped the global financial and monetary architecture that persisted until the 
dismantling of the U.S. dollar-gold parity in 1974. This stance was reflected
in Article VI:3 of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles, which 
allows members to “exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate
international capital movements.”57 In the forty years since the beginning of
financial liberalization in the 1980s, most countries imposed capital controls, 
mainly on the outflow of capital.58 This drastically limited any form of cross-
border finance. Unlike previous phases, however, financial protectionism did 
not entail currency restrictions that were prohibited by the IMF Articles and
the WTO GATT, since currency restrictions would limit international 
trade.59 
C. The Rise of (Selective) Financial Cooperation
The period from the late 1970s until the global financial crisis is 
unanimously considered as the heyday of financial globalization. The demise
of the U.S. dollar-gold parity in 1974 and the rise of the eurocurrency market 
54. John Maynard Keynes, Proposals for an International Currency (or Clearing) Union (1942), 
reprinted in THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1945–65 13 (J. Keith Horsefield ed., 1969).
 55. JEFFREY M. CHENWORTH, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMF AND THE RISE OF FINANCIAL
LIBERALIZATION 63–70 (2010).
 56. Id.
57. Articles of Agreement of the IMF, art. VI § 3, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (2016). See also
Legal Dep’t, Capital Movements: Legal Aspects of Fund Jurisdiction Under the Articles, SM/97/32 Supp. 
3 (Feb. 21, 1997).
58.  Ghosh & Qureshi, supra note 50.
 59. See Articles of Agreement of the IMF, art. XVIII § 2, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39; General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. XI, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994).
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propelled the progressive integration of national financial systems.60 The
process of liberalization started slowly with the gradual removal of capital 
controls in western economies. During this phase, only a few banks put their
foot into another state’s financial system. While capital controls on the
outflow of capital were reduced and cross-border lending allowed, 
restrictions on the establishment of commercial presence by foreign financial
institutions were still widespread. In the 1980s, however, cross-border 
banking started to emerge as a force in global markets. The Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Code on Capital 
Movements and Invisible Operations was the very first international
agreement focused on dismantling barriers to cross-border finance.61 The 
movement for financial integration was spurred by the European ambitions
to achieve a fully-integrated, single market among European states. As stated
in the Delors Report 1989, this would have never been completed unless 
European firms were allowed to operate in other European states’ financial
systems.62 American and Japanese banks also became more and more
international. The process of financial globalization culminated in the early
1990s’ Washington Consensus, which featured the liberalization of financial 
systems and the total removal of any restrictions on capital flows as one of 
its core tenets.63 When the WTO GATS Annex on Financial Services was 
finally agreed upon in 1997, the regulatory architecture to support financial 
liberalization was complete.64 IM and Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) data on financial globalization shows that before the global financial 
crisis, the global financial system reached its highest level of integration with
the emergence of giant banking conglomerates operating across the globe 
and hyper-connected capital markets.65 
The first threat to this hyper-financial globalization came from 
60. See generally EICHENGREEN, supra note 4.
 61. ABDELAL, supra note 4, at 86–123; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
[OECD], Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements (2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/978926411077
9-en; OECD, Codes of Liberalisation: User’s Guide (2007); OECD, Forty Years’ Experience with the 
OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements 7 (Oct. 2002); PIERRE PORET, The Experience of
the OECD with the Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements (2000) (presented at the IMF seminar). 
For the most updated version of the Code, see OECD, Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements
(2019), https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/OECD-Code-capital-movements-2019-EN.pdf. 
62. ABDELAL, supra note 4, at 54–86.
 63. See John Williamson, Senior Fellow, Institute for Int’l Econ., The Washington Consensus as 
Policy Prescription for Development 6–8 (Jan. 13, 2004), https://www.piie.com/publications/papers/ 
williamson0204.pdf (listing “[f]inancial liberalization” and the abolition of barriers to direct foreign
investment as part of the “Ten Commandments” of the Washington Consensus).
 64. See  SYDNEY J. KEY, THE DOHA ROUND AND FINANCIAL SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS (2003)
(stating that the agreement on the Annex on Financial Services was formally reached on Dec. 12, 1997, 
while the text entered into force on Mar 1, 1999).
 65. IMF, supra note 4.
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emerging economies. The literature on international finance has never been 
fully supportive of financial integration in the same way that it has for 
international trade.66 In an influential article, Jagdish Bhagwati questioned 
the wisdom of financial globalization; as he argued, trading in widgets and
trading in dollars is not the same.67 Indeed, in a matter of five years, the hopes
that financial globalization would solve the problems of economic
development were dashed by a series of financial and monetary crises fueled
by global capital flows. First came the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, 
which questioned the limits of financial liberalization in Asia.68 Then, the
Russian and Argentine sovereign debt crises in 2000 and 2001, respectively,
showed once again the dangers of the sovereign debt markets and over-
indebtedness.69 In past occasions, the recipe for regaining monetary stability 
was a combination of IMF loans, capital controls, banking protectionism, a 
very painful haircut to creditors, and the general retrenchment of finance 
along national lines. In this case however, the reasons for the protectionist 
policies and capital controls, many of which were then lifted over time, albeit
with difficulty, were the protection of monetary and financial stability. Only
on one occasion, in Argentina, has financial protectionism had a broader
political connotation; that is, the protection of national pride against foreign 
capital markets.70 
The situation in Western economies was much easier, as monetary and 
structural conditions permitted the safe opening of markets to financial 
liberalization and capital flows. Yet despite the tight level of liberalization, 
this phase saw the emergence of different forms of financial protectionism:
66. For an overview of the literature prior to the crisis, see generally Stijn Claessens, Regulatory 
Reform and Trade Liberalization in Financial Services, in  DOMESTIC REGULATION AND TRADE
LIBERALIZATION IN SERVICES 129 (Aaditya Mattoo & Pierre Suavé eds., 2003); GLOBALIZATION AND
SYSTEMIC RISK (Douglas D. Evanoff et al. eds., 2009). 
67. Jagdish Bhagwati, The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in Widgets and Dollars, 
77 FOREIGN AFF. 7, 8 (1998).
68. Ross P. Buckley & Sarala M. Fitzgerald, An Assessment of Malaysia’s Response to the IMF 
During the Asian Economic Crisis, 2004 SING. LEG. STUD. 96, 97 (2004).
 69. See  ROSS P. BUCKLEY & DOUGLAS W. ARNER, FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS: THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND REGULATORY FAILURES 83–85 (2011) (discussing the Russian and Argentine 
sovereign debt crises).
70. Argentinian Presidents Néstor Kirchner (2003–2007) and Cristina Kirchner (2007–2011) were 
adamantly opposed to the opening of Argentina to capital markets due to the stand-off with international 
creditors. The stance changed in 2016 under President Mauricio Macri, who settled the long-standing 
dispute with creditors and paved the way for the re-opening of international credit lines to Argentina by 
international capital markets. See Michael Stott & Benedict Mander, Argentina: How IMF’s Biggest 
Bailout Crumbled Under Macri, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/5cfe7c34-ca48-
11e9-a1f4-3669401ba76f (describing the financial crisis, resulting bailout agreement, and subsequent
market chaos in Argentina). On the dispute between Argentina and the investors, see Arturo C.
Porzecanski, The Origins of Argentina’s Litigation and Arbitration Saga, 2002-2016 (MPRA Paper No.
79122, May 2017).
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selective regulation and policy divergence. This time, the worry of 
policymakers regarding the adoption of nationalist policies was no longer the
risks posed by an open capital account, but rather the erosion of regulatory
and supervisory sovereignty.71 The goal was no longer to prevent foreign
banks from providing financial services to local customers or to safeguard
monetary stability, although this was still present in emerging markets,  but 
rather to maintain a political grip on those aspects of banking policy that are 
particularly sensitive or strategic. During this phase, the adoption of capital
controls gave way to a subtler form of nationalism that mostly manifested 
itself in regulators’ reluctance to fully cooperate on supervisory and
regulatory policies, especially when these were perceived to be contrary to 
national interests.72 This might sound surprising, given that it is precisely in
this period that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was 
established to enhance regulatory cooperation in banking matters.73 Two of
the key standards on international banking—the Basel Concordat and the
Basel Accords—were negotiated to reduce regulatory and supervisory
frictions among national authorities and are widely believed to have greatly
helped level the regulatory playing field for global finance. Yet beneath the 
façade of cooperation, regulators were always very aware of the risks that 
the full erosion of financial sovereignty might have entailed. 
The global financial crisis of 2008 and the European sovereign debt 
crisis of 2010–12 clearly showed the limits of cooperation in finance, 
especially if compared to achievements in other areas like international trade
or investment. First of all, the process of regulatory convergence on financial 
standards did not bind regulators to a detailed regulatory playing field.
Instead, the regulatory perimeter of global finance was predicated on the
voluntary adoption of a few key international standards and numerous 
guidelines and declarations of principle.74 In many instances, this led to 
actual regulatory divergence as regulators opted for the interpretation of the 
standards that was more favorable to them, rather than what would have been
optimal for the global financial system.75 Secondly, critical areas in the
71. See LUPO-PASINI, supra note 6.
72.  On capital controls, see Ghosh & Qureshi, supra note 50.
 73. See generally  CHARLES GOODHART, THE BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION: A
HISTORY OF THE EARLY YEARS 1974–1996 (2012) (discussing the formative years of the Basel
Committee); GEORGE ALEXANDER WALKER, INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION: LAW, POLICY,
AND PRACTICE (2001) (discussing historical and contemporary efforts to incentivize and enforce 
international banking regulation). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was founded in 1974.
 74. BRUMMER, supra note 5; Mario Giovanoli, A New Architecture for the Global Financial 
Market: Legal Aspects of International Financial Standard Settings, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
LAW: ISSUES FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 3, 33 (Mario Giovanoli ed., 2000); Chris Brummer, How
International Financial Law Works (and How it Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257, 263 (2011).
 75. DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
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functioning of the global financial system, such as cross-border resolution 
and insolvencies, were left in the hands of national authorities.76 As Lord 
Mervin King succinctly put it, this led to a situation whereby “global banks
[were] global in life but national in death.”77 
The quintessential example of these protectionist tendencies is how the 
Lehman Brothers’ insolvency in 2008 was managed in a way to protect the 
interests of U.S. creditors, to the detriment of the bank’s European and global 
operations.78 Other illuminating examples include the disorderly resolutions
of Fortis Bank and Dexia during the European sovereign debt crisis of 2010– 
12.79 The sovereign control on cross-border banks was not limited to
resolution and insolvencies, but extended also to supervisory practices, 
which were paradoxically subject to a decent degree of cooperation. The 
literature on home-host supervisory coordination, indeed, has widely
reported the incentive problems faced by national supervisory authorities in
their cooperation with foreign counterparts since the Banco Ambrosiano and 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International in the 1980s.80 The history of 
cross-border banking reports various occasions in which supervisors prefer 
to forbear from disclosing the true status of the bank to protect local creditors 
or to prevent a sell-off.81 The problems of supervisory cooperation became 
all too apparent in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis when
various countries refused to cooperate with fellow European supervisors in
resolving failing banks.82 In one instance, the Icesave crisis, the home 
authority refused to abide by its legal obligations to provide depositor
protection to U.K. and Dutch retail depositors, as required by E.U. law.83 
REGULATION 218–21 (2007). See also Narissa Lyngen, Basel III: Dynamics of State Implementation, 53 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 519, 522 (2012) (discussing the pressures on regulators to seek self-serving regulations).
76.  Rosa M. Lastra, International Law Principles Applicable to Cross-Border Bank Insolvency, in
CROSS-BORDER BANK INSOLVENCY 161, 161 (Rose M. Lastra ed., 2011).
 77. THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 36 (2009). 
78. DIRK SCHOENMAKER, GOVERNANCE OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING: THE FINANCIAL 
TRILEMMA 72–76 (2013).
 79. STIJN CLAESSENS ET AL., A SAFER WORLD FINANCIAL SYSTEM: IMPROVING THE RESOLUTION
OF SYSTEMIC INSTITUTIONS 49–51 (2011).
80. For examples of the literature, see generally CROSS BORDER BANKING: REGULATORY 
CHALLENGES (Gerard Caprio Jr. et al. eds., 2006); Kathia D’Hulster, Cross Border Banking Supervision 
Incentive Conflicts in Supervisory Information Sharing Between Home and Host Supervisors (World
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 5871, 2011).
 81. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTABILITY: GLOBAL BANKING AND NATIONAL REGULATIONS
440–41 (Douglas D. Evanoff et al. eds., 2007).
 82. CROSS-BORDER BANKING IN EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY AND
MACROECONOMIC POLICIES 41–42 (Franklin Allen et al. eds., 2011).
83. Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland, 2011 E.F.T.A Ct. Rep. 4. For analyses
of the case, see M. Elvira Mendez-Pinedo, Iceland and the EU: Bitter Lessons after the Bank Collapse
and the Icesave Dispute, 3 CONTEMP. LEGAL & ECON ISSUES 9 (2011); M. Elvira Méndez-Pinedo, The
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III. THE RE-EMERGENCE OF FINANCIAL NATIONALISM
The global financial crisis and the European sovereign crisis were 
turning points in the regulation of finance. The regulatory and supervisory 
loopholes so evident in the functioning of the global financial system 
propelled a number of reforms in the actual regulation of banks and capital 
markets and in the global financial architecture. With regard to the latter, the 
IMF has acquired a more preponderant supervisory role in monitoring global 
financial stability and global imbalances.84 The Financial Stability Board 
was created recently to monitor progress in the regulation of finance among
G20 and BIS countries and to propose new regulations, essentially acting as 
a think-tank on global financial reforms.85 In the European Union, the
problems of supervisory cooperation have been addressed—at least among 
Eurozone countries—by transferring the competences to supervise and 
resolve European banks to two supranational European authorities. 
Yet despite these regulatory and institutional changes, we are now 
witnessing the re-emergence of new, and sometimes more populist and
adversarial, forms of financial nationalism.
A. Regulatory Unilateralism 
Regulatory cooperation through the adoption of common, prudential 
standards for financial institutions was one of the key developments in the 
post-Bretton Woods financial system. Although regulatory convergence 
never reached full harmonization outside the European Union, and by no 
means covered the entire scope of prudential regulations, it nonetheless put 
western countries on a similar regulatory playing field in key areas. The 
entire edifice of global financial regulation rested on the tacit commitments
by national regulators to work together behind the closed doors of the various 
TRNs until an agreement could be found. Given the differences in regulatory
philosophies, economic needs, and ambitions among the TRNs’ members, 
conflicts often arose, but they were always dealt with behind the scenes.86 
More importantly, they never threatened members’ commitment to 
cooperate or their core belief in the importance of the TRN’s work. Yet 
recent political changes in the United States with the Trump presidency and 
in Europe with Brexit seem to question the sustainability of this trajectory.
Icesave Saga: Iceland Wins Battle before the EFTA Court, 1 MICH. J. INT’L L. 101 (2013).
 84. IMF, Vulnerabilities in a Maturing Credit Cycle, Global Financial Stability Report (Apr. 2019). 
85. Stavros Gadinis, The Financial Stability Board: The New Politics of International Financial 
Regulation, 48 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 157, 158–59 (2013).
 86. See GOODHART, supra note 73, at 77 (“[M]uch of the exchange of information, the building-
up of mutual trust and the overall value of such meetings resides in the informal discussions held, owing 
to the existence of the formal meeting, but outside its regular meetings.”).
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1. Uncertainties in Trump’s Regulatory Reforms 
The very first threat to regulatory cooperation came from the new 
approach to financial regulation of the Trump Presidency. During the 
election campaign and immediately upon entering office, President Trump
openly voiced his dissatisfaction with the current financial regulatory 
framework and repeatedly urged a change in U.S. policy. In February 2017,
the President signed Executive Order 13772: “Core Principles for Regulating 
the United States Financial System,” which sets forth seven fundamental
principles of U.S. financial regulation.87 One of those principles is to 
“[a]dvance American interests in international financial regulatory
negotiations and meetings.”88 This can be read as a more interventionist, 
rather than accommodating, approach to financial cooperation, in which U.S. 
regulators would not back off from fighting any standard that could 
negatively affect the U.S. financial system. The Executive Order indeed
contains another fundamental principle, “enable American companies to be
competitive with foreign firms in domestic and foreign markets.”89 Engaging
in international standard-setting fora is critical for promoting U.S. interests 
across the global financial system, as they are meant to act as the vehicle for
this, rather than unilateral actions. 
Yet the Financial CHOICE Act 2017, which passed the House on June 
8 and is still pending in the Senate, poses a far greater danger for policy 
coordination.90 From a cooperation viewpoint, the Act would increase the 
role of the U.S. Senate in the pre-negotiation stage of international financial 
standards so that the various U.S. agencies would have to declare and gain 
approval for their negotiating position before going to standard-setting
international organizations.91 This could make international cooperation 
more challenging, as it would reduce the negotiating freedom of U.S. 
regulators for a parallel increase in political oversight. 
In April 2017, the President requested the Secretary of the Treasury to
review the role of the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) in the Dodd-
Frank Act with the goal to return to a pre-Lehman bankruptcy regime for 
financial institutions.92 In the last five years, the U.S. Federal Deposit 
87.  Exec. Order No. 13772, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965 (Feb. 8, 2017).
 88. Id.
 89. Id.
 90. See Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017).
91. Anna Gelpern, Conference: US Interest in International Financial Cooperation 30 (March 17,
2017), https://www.piie.com/file/12930/.
92. See Lalita Clozel, Trump Invites Trouble In Targeting FDIC Resolution Powers, AM. BANKER
(Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/trump-invites-trouble-in-targeting-fdic-
resolution-powers (Trump’s memorandum asking for review of the OLA “is seen as an indication it will 
seek a legislative fix”).
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Insurance Corporation has increased its cooperation on cross-border banking 
resolution, building on the new resolution regime provided by Dodd-Frank 
Act. Not surprisingly, various authors have commented on the dangers that 
scrapping OLA would pose for international banking cooperation.93 
Thankfully, in February 2018 the U.S. Treasury rejected the idea and instead
committed to simply “narrow the path of OLA,” noting that this would have 
significantly higher regulatory costs for U.S. banks in other countries.94 
The biggest regulatory change in U.S. financial regulation is the May
2018 Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, 
commonly known as the Financial Reform Act 2018.95 This new legislation 
repealed parts of the Dodd-Frank Act, which was seen as constraining the
lending growth opportunities of American banks.96 From an international
cooperation viewpoint, one of the greatest dangers of Trump’s regulatory
reform is less-favorable, prudential treatment for non-U.S. financial 
organizations, which are, in certain cases, required to comply with more
stringent capital adequacy standards than U.S. firms. More specifically, any 
foreign business organization firm with total assets of one hundred billion 
dollars or more would be subject to the same prudential regulations that 
apply to U.S. banks with two hundred and fifty billion or more of 
consolidated assets.97 
The evolving situation in the U.S. regulatory sphere led to immediate 
repercussions and increased tensions in Basel between the European Union 
and the United States. These two major financial rule-makers had been
fighting a war for almost five years on the regulation of Over-the-Counter 
Derivatives and Central Counterparties (“CCPs”).98 This regulatory turf
93. See Daniel Tarullo, Repealing Title II of Dodd-Frank, GLOBAL CTR. FOR FIN. AND POL’Y (May
8, 2017), https://gcfp.mit.edu/tarullo-guest-blog/ (stating that changes to the OLA could lead countries to
“complete ring-fencing of U.S. bank operations in their countries”); Simon Johnson, Conference: US 
Interest in International Financial Cooperation 31–35 (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.piie.com/file/12930/
(discussing the importance of international cooperation to U.S. interests). 
94. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY AND BANKRUPTCY REFORM 1– 
2 (2018), https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-02/OLA_REPORT.pdf. 
95. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-174, 132 
Stat. 1296 (2018).
 96. See Joseph Lawler, Dodd-Frank Has Hurt Small Business Lending and May Have Slowed
Business Growth, New Study Says, WASH. EXAMINER (Apr. 16, 2018),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/economy/dodd-frank-has-hurt-small-business-lending-
and-may-have-slowed-business-growth-new-study-says (“The Dodd-Frank financial reform law slowed 
lending to small businesses and likely constrained economic growth by overburdening small banks, 
according to a new economic study released Monday.”). 
97. Jeff Berman, US Congress Passes Dodd-Frank Reform Legislation with A Clarification (And 
Little Else) For Foreign Banks, CLIFFORD CHANCE BRIEFINGS (May 2018),
https://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2018/05/u_s_congress_passesdodd- frankrefor.html.
 98. See LUPO-PASINI, supra note 6, at 150–74.
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threatened to split the lucrative derivative market into two, but it was finally 
solved in 2016 when the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) and the European Securities Market Authority finally announced the 
deal on the equivalence of CCP regimes, the so-called “common
approach.”99 Not long after that, the new version of the Basel standards, 
dubbed by the industry as Basel IV, proved to be a new source of contention 
between the European Union and the United States. 
The origin of the dispute was the use of internal models to calculate the 
risk-weight of assets; more precisely, the so called “output floor.” This floor 
serves to prevent banks from using internal models that lead to risk estimates
on the outputs that are too far from those produced by the standardized 
models.100 The European Union, pushed by the interests of German and 
French banks, favored the status quo, which would still allow for the free use 
of internal models. The United States would like to scrap this in favor of a
more standardized approach. One of the main areas of concern for the
European Union is the use of the standardized approach to calculate the risk
of government debt.101 European banks are indeed historically prone to
buying sovereign debt, especially from their own government.102 The issue
is of fundamental importance for E.U. banks at a time when they are 
struggling to make profits, as the standardized approach would force them to
raise their capital in a market where banks have been struggling to do so.
After much fighting and various postponements, the revised standard 
was eventually published in December 2017.103 Yet some commentators 
99. Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, The U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission and the European Commission: Common Approach for Transatlantic CCPs (Feb. 
10, 2016), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/cftc_euapproach021016.
 100. See Caroline Binham, Basel III Reform Package Closer to Being Finalized, FIN. TIMES (May
25, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/4da280d2-40ac-11e7-82b6-896b95f30f58 (discussing BSBS
Secretary General William Coen’s May 2017 description of the output floor proposed as “simple and 
straightforward—a bank’s measure of risk-weighted assets (using internal models) can, in aggregate, be
no lower than, say, 70-75 per cent of the risk-weighted assets that would result if the bank had applied
the standardised approaches to determine its risk-weighted assets”).
 101. See Jacek Ramotowski, Basel IV at a Standstill, CENT. EUR. FIN. OBSERVER (Apr. 28, 2017), 
https://financialobserver.eu/poland/basel-iv-at-a-standstill (discussing European banks’ concern that the
new standardized approach for calculating risks would mean that banks would face more capital
requirements that European banks would have a harder time achieving).
102. Silvia Merler & Jean Pisani-Ferry, Hazardous Tango: Sovereign-Bank Interdependence and 
Financial Stability in the Euro Area, in PUBLIC DEBT, MONETARY POLICY AND FINANCIAL STABILITY
16 BANQUE DE FRANCE 201 (2012); SEBASTIAN SCHNEIDER ET AL., BASEL “IV”: WHAT’S NEXT FOR
BANKS? IMPLICATIONS OF INTERMEDIATE RESULTS OF NEW REGULATORY RULES FOR EUROPEAN
BANKS 10 (2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/risk/
our%20insights/basel%20iv%20whats%20next%20for%20european%20banks/basel-iv-whats-next-for-
banks.ashx.
 103. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: FINALISING POST-CRISIS REFORMS
(2017), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.pdf.
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have pointed out that the new standard is so vague and open to interpretation 
that, de facto, the standard provides ample room for regulatory divergence.104 
The new standard contains 36 “national caveats” that serve to protect
regulatory discretion in the implementation of the standards. The risk of
regulatory divergence caused by the diverging interpretation of the standards 
is not new. Indeed, the poor record of Basel II in addressing systemic risk is
due to the wide flexibility that it gave in the implementation of the risk-
weighting calculation model, which then led to U.S. banks being massively
undercapitalized.105 In the recent 2018 Progress Report on the Adoption of 
Basel Framework, the Basel Committee suggested that, despite the good 
level of implementation of certain Basel standards among BCBS members,
there might be still various loopholes in the implementation of certain key 
aspects, namely approaches to measure exposures to CCPs, and capital 
requirements for exposures to CCPs.106 Other authors have evidenced that, 
while OECD and Basel Committee members are formally applying the Basel
standards, a wide gap remains in the actual implementation of the standards,
including the previous versions of Basel I and II,  in all other countries. This 
inevitably leads to frictions and regulatory divergence.107 
2. The Dangers of Brexit 
A very different threat comes from Brexit. One of the major fallouts
from Brexit with regard to financial services is the proposal by the European 
Commission (Commission) to adopt a more “centralized” supervision of 
clearinghouses if they provide critical capital market functions for the 
European Union financial system.108 If this proposal goes ahead, CCPs that
are refused recognition will have to migrate to the European Union, if they
want to continue to offer clearing services to E.U. traders. Estimates suggest
that around €101 billion of derivatives are cleared daily in London, around
ninety percent of the overall Euro-derivatives market. In a speech on June
20, 2018, Benoît Coeuré, a member of the European Central Bank (ECB) 
Executive Board, suggested that the regulatory and supervisory cooperation 
104. Simon Samuels, Confusion over Basel Bank Capital Requirements Fails Us All, FIN. TIMES
(Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/a7ad01a4-16fa-11e8-9c33-02f893d608c2.
 105. See TARULLO, supra note 75, at 236.
 106. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, FOURTEENTH PROGRESS REPORT ON ADOPTION OF
THE BASEL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (2018), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d440.pdf.
 107. See Emily Jones & Alexandra O. Zeitz, The Limits of Globalizing Basel Banking Standards, 3
J. FIN. REG. 89, 123–24 (2017) (stating that the need for changes to the Basel standards before they can
be effectively implemented in many countries which do not have comparably established financial 
sectors, especially developing countries, leads to selective and shallow implementation of those 
standards, relative to that of more developed countries).
108. Jim Brunsden & Philip Stafford, EU Asserts Power over City’s Euro Clearing Role, FIN. TIMES, 
(Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/3d0b0f6a-45b3-11e9-a965-23d669740bfb.
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mechanisms that are in place between the ECB and the Bank of England are
in serious jeopardy after Brexit.109 This is due to the well-known refusal of
the British government to accept the jurisdiction of the European Court of
Justice (ECJ).
The proposal is contained in the amendment of the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation, which gives power to the European Securities 
Markets Authority to decide whether a clearinghouse is systemically
important for the E.U. financial system and potentially to the ECB to oversee 
central third-country counterparties clearing euro trades.110 The point of
contention in the proposal is the ability of the Commission to refuse
recognition (i.e., market access) to those CCPs that are located outside 
Europe and are considered as carrying excessive risks for the European 
financial system, due to their size or the type of transaction. If this proposal 
goes ahead, CCPs that are refused recognition will have to migrate to the 
European Union, if they want to continue to offer clearing services to EU
traders. The ECB has, for a long time, advocated a return of supervision of 
euro-trades clearinghouses back to Frankfurt. In 2015, the ECB lost a 
landmark legal battle at the ECJ over the “location policy” precisely because 
the ECJ found the ECB to lack competence over the supervision of 
clearinghouses.111 
On the British front, the Governor of the Bank of England has dismissed
the ECB fears, pointing out that USD trading is also cleared outside the
United States with no concerns.112 He also warned that splitting the euro-
clearing market could increase costs and inefficiencies, and potentially split 
the market in two. E.U. traders that are unable to move their trades from U.K.
clearinghouses could face capital charges up to ten times higher than today.
Yet the new regulatory approach by E.U. authorities is already having an
impact on the market. In June 2018, HSBC and Barclays, two of the largest 
banks trading in derivatives, have decided to move their clearing operation
from London to Frankfurt.113 
109. Benoît Coeuré, Exec. Bd. Member, European Cent. Bank, European CCPs After Brexit, 
Address at the Global Financial Market Association (June 20, 2017), https://www.bis.org/
review/r170706b.htm.
110. Jim Brunsden & Philip Stafford, Brussels Insists on Power to Control Euro Clearing After 
Brexit, FIN. TIMES (June 12, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/60cb441a-4f83-11e7-bfb8-
997009366969.
111. Alex Barker & Philip Strafford, Victory for UK over Eurozone Clearing Houses, FIN. TIMES
(Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/425aeee0-c24f-11e4-bd9f-00144feab7de. 
112. Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of Eng., A Fine Balance, Address at the Mansion House (June
20, 2017).
 113. Philip Stafford, Two Big UK Banks Shift Some Euro Clearing from London to Frankfurt, FIN.
TIMES (June 12, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/974e17ec-6e27-11e8-852d-d8b934ff5ffa.
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B. Ring-Fencing and Host-Country Control 
For banks, financial globalization means the freedom to operate in 
another country through the establishment of branches or subsidiaries.
Moving assets across the banking group allows global banks to exploit 
interest rate differentials, thus raising capital where it is cheaper and lending 
it where it is more profitable. More generally, banks can achieve allocative 
efficiencies and structure their investment and debt portfolio in the most
profitable way across the banking group.114 The positive effects are more
pronounced when global banks penetrate through branches, as regulatory
barriers on intra-corporate assets flows are minimal.115 Not surprisingly,
studies showed that when entry restrictions were minimal, foreign banks 
indeed preferred to operate through branches.116 Yet since the global
financial crisis, we are witnessing a progressive balkanization of banking
across national lines that threatens to disrupt the globalization of finance.117 
The word “ring-fencing” entered finance vocabulary at the outset of the 
global financial crisis, when both the United Kingdom and the United States 
adopted legislation to separate a bank’s risky activities from its retail 
operations.118 As such, these measures simply target the commercial and 
corporate functions of banks once they operate in the national territory. Yet 
another form of “ring-fencing” has recently emerged in financial regulatory
circles and has since become synonymous with financial nationalism: the 
requirement for cross-border banks to separate the assets of the foreign 
branch or subsidiary from the parent company.119 
The objective of geographical ring-fencing, as opposed to traditional 
ring-fencing, is to insulate the various national operations of the cross-border 
banking group from the contagion risk that would arise in the event of a
114. SCHOENMAKER, supra note 78; WORLD BANK GROUP, GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2017/2018: BANKERS WITHOUT BORDERS 21–38 (2018).
 115. See Eugenio Cerutti et al., How Banks Go Abroad: Branches or Subsidiaries?, 31 J. BANKING
& FIN. 1669 (2007) (discussing findings of a study of Europe and Latin America’s top banks that were 
more likely to operate as branches in countries with lower regulatory restrictions).
 116. Id.
117. Linda Goldberg & Arun Gupta, Ring-Fencing and Financial Protectionism in International
Banking, LIBERTY STREET ECON. FED. RES. BANK N.Y. (Jan. 9, 2013), 
https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2013/01/ring-fencing-and-financial-protectionism-in-
international-banking.html; Wilson Ervin, Understanding ‘Ring-Fencing’ And How It Could Make 
Banking Riskier, BROOKINGS (Feb. 7, 2015).
118. The former adopted the legislation under the now semi-defunct Volcker rule, the latter under 
the Vicker’s Commission Report. See Allison Lui, Retail Ring-Fencing of Banks and its Implications, 13 
J. BANKING REG. 336 (2012) (explaining structural reforms and ring-fencing by the United Kingdom and 
United States banks).
 119. For a full discussion on this topic, see Katia D’Hulster & Inci Otker-Robe, Ring-Fencing
Cross-Border Banks: An Effective Supervisory Response?, J. FIN. PERSP. (2018).
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crisis. To do so, regulators rely on a panoply of measures, ranging from 
exposure limits towards other companies in the group to higher capital and 
liquidity requirements for the foreign subsidiaries, or even restrictions on the 
bank management to ensure its independence from the group
management.120 Ultimately, the legal deconstruction of the firm to allocate 
the risk across its corporate structure can be achieved by separating the assets
of the firm, preventing the firm from taking certain risks, or protecting it
from the bankruptcy of other firms in the group.121 
Yet the effect of ring-fencing on global finance is to limit the flow of 
capital across the banking group. Indeed, localization requirements do not
wholly differ from capital controls, as banks are forced to keep their assets
and most liquidity locally. Similarly, enhanced supervisory or prudential
requirements are regulatory barriers that limit access to the foreign financial
system. For both, the ultimate outcome is that global banking groups will
reduce their global footprint and operate on a smaller scale. Hence, the
classical benefits of global finance are reduced. 
Ring-fencing can be adopted by both home and host supervisors. Host 
supervisors, for instance, often prefer to exert full control over foreign banks, 
rather than being subjected to the financial risks that come from branches. 
They do so by requiring foreign banks to establish their presence only
through subsidiaries—the so-called “stand-alone subsidiary model.” This 
allows the host supervisor to supervise and directly regulate the bank no
differently than a local one, and to ensure that capital and debt are located
nationally. For instance, in 2013, the Reserve Bank of India and the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand issued regulations requiring foreign banks to establish
through stand-alone subsidiaries and be fully subject to their supervisory 
requirements. Similar requirements are applied in Brazil and Mexico.122 
In many other cases, the desire to retain a higher degree of control over
the foreign bank is achieved by increasing the prudential requirements for
foreign branches. For instance, in 2014, the Federal Reserve issued a rule 
whereby a large foreign bank with an extensive presence in the United States 
is required to operate through an intermediate holding company controlling 
all the bank’s U.S. subsidiaries. This allows U.S. authorities to control the 
bank in the event of a crisis.123 The operational effects of such a policy were
120. See Inwon Song, Foreign Bank Supervision and Challenges to Emerging Market Supervisors
19 (IMF, Working Paper 04/82, 2004) (discussing regulatory challenges and the various tools regulators
have at their disposal).
 121. See Steven Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 69 (2013) (discussing the multiple
regulatory reasons in support of ring-fencing, with a particular focus on systemic risks). 
122.  D’Hulster & Otker-Robe, supra note 119, at 16.
123. This was required by section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act. 
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demonstrated in June 2018, when Deutsche Bank’s U.S. subsidiary failed 
stress tests.124 To reallocate assets more efficiently across the bank group and 
to replenish the capital of the German parent bank, Deutsche Bank’s parent 
tried to repatriate U.S. dividends back to Frankfurt headquarters, but it was 
soon stopped by the U.S. regulator.125 The U.K. Prudential Regulation
Authority has established enhanced stand-alone liquidity requirements for 
all foreign banks’ branches and subsidiaries. In Latin America, most 
countries subject foreign banks’ branches to the same liquidity and capital 
requirements of subsidiaries. In 2016, the European Commission proposed 
the application of a rule called the Intermediate Parent Undertaking (IPU), 
mimicking the U.S. Intermediate Holding Company insofar as it requires 
large foreign firms operating in the European Union to ring-fence capital to
protect the firm in the event of distress.126 Reports suggest that after two 
years of negotiation, the Commission will probably publish the final 
proposal.127 
Home authorities sometimes impose limits on their home banks’ 
international expansion and on the level of support from the parent to the
foreign affiliates. Before the crisis, it was not uncommon for host supervisors 
to expect the parent bank to support the foreign branches and subsidiaries in
times of crisis under what was called the “source of strength” doctrine.128 
Yet this often came with considerable risks for the home financial system, as 
the parents sometimes had to be bailed out to cover losses in its foreign 
affiliates. For instance, in 2015 the collapse of Portugal’s Banco Espirito 
Santo, among others, was caused by the extensive transfers of funds from the 
parent bank to the subsidiaries in Africa and Panama. Typically, Spanish
banks are subject to very tight supervisory controls by the home authorities 
over the level of support given to their foreign operations in Latin 
124. Stress tests are simulations of a particular economic scenario—usually an economic and 
financial crisis—that  all banks are required to conduct. Stress tests are designed and supervised by
Central Banks and serve to assess how banks and the financial system would behave during a crisis. Laura 
Noonan & Barney Jopson, Deutsche Bank Failure in US Stress Test Could Harm Strategic Plan, FIN.
TIMES (June 29, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/db7f1a64-7bac-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d. 
125. Id.
 126. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive 
2013/36/EU as Regards Exempted Entities, Financial Holding Companies, Mixed Financial Holding 
Companies, Remuneration, Supervisory Measures and Powers and Capital Conservation Measures, 
COM (2016) 854 final (Nov. 23, 2016).
127. Conor MacManus & Mete Feridun, Intermediate Parent Undertaking: Time to Prepare, FSRR 
(Sept. 19, 2018), https://pwc.blogs.com/fsrr/2018/09/intermediate-parent-undertaking-time-to-
prepare.html.
 128. See generally Paul L. Lee, The Source-of-Strength Doctrine: Revered and Revisited—Part I, 
129 BANKING L.J. 771 (2012) (discussing the source of strength-of-strength doctrine and its application 
to the Dodd-Frank Act).
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America.129 
Finally, it is worth mentioning the recent developments on financial
integration in the context of the Association of South East Asian Nation 
(ASEAN), which show the predilection for a model of integration based on 
host-country control.130 As part of the ASEAN Economic Community
Blueprint 2025, which aims at creating a single market in the ASEAN region, 
ASEAN members have agreed to progressively integrate their financial 
sectors.131 The key pillar for banking is the ASEAN Bank Integration 
Framework. According to this instrument, qualified ASEAN Banks will be 
able to establish a commercial presence in another ASEAN jurisdiction with 
which their home regulator has entered into a mutual recognition agreement. 
Crucially, they will be able to do so only to the extent that they comply with 
the host’s supervisory and prudential requirements.132 
C. Digital Protectionism 
An emerging problem is the impact of digital protectionism on the 
burgeoning FinTech sector. Finance has been caught by a dramatic digital
revolution over the last five years. The traditional business models of banks 
and payment intermediaries are increasingly challenged by a new way of 
doing business relying solely on the power of digital platforms. This model
often bypasses the regulatory and financial constraints of the traditional brick 
and mortar banks. These newcomers to the financial world include online 
digital lenders, e-payment providers, and a variety of support services, all 
operating through online platforms and relying in one way or another on the
network externalities of the internet. These new financial intermediaries— 
what Brett King defined as “Bank 3.0”—pose very different regulatory risks 
compared to traditional banks and, consequently, are subject to very different 
policy challenges.133 
One of the main challenges comes from the hybrid nature of FinTech
firms, which rely heavily on the use and storage of data. Data are 
129. D’Hulster & Otker-Robe, supra note 119, at 5. See also Jonathan Fiechter et al., Branches or 
Subsidiaries: Does One Size Fit All? 22 (IMF, Staff Discussion Note SDN/11/04, 2011) (discussing the 
Spanish cross-border banking model). 
130 See Federico Lupo-Pasini, Banking Integration in ASEAN and the Challenges of Regulatory 
Cooperation, in ASEAN LAW IN THE NEW REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: GLOBAL TRENDS AND
SHIFTING PARADIGMS 129, 129–48 (Mercurio & Hseih eds., 2019).
131. Assoc. of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], Economic Community Blueprint 2025 (Nov.
2015), https://www.asean.org/storage/2016/03/AECBP_2025r_FINAL.pdf; Geert Almekinders et al.,
ASEAN Financial Integration (IMF Working Paper No. WP/15/34, 2015).
 132. See Lupo-Pasini, supra note 130.
133. Financial Stability Board [FSB], Summary Report on Financial Sector Cybersecurity 
Regulations, Guidance and Supervisory Practices (Oct. 13, 2017).
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increasingly becoming a precious asset for all sort of firms, including 
traditional financial institutions. In the United Kingdom, the “Open
Banking” initiative, the U.K. version of the E.U. Payment Service Directive 
2, requires banks to share customer data with competitors. Moreover, 
financial institutions are under increased pressure to guarantee that the 
storage of their data on cloud services are protected from hackers. However, 
the importance of data for FinTech firms goes further than that. For instance,
e-payment providers often operate through mobile platforms connected to 
underlying mobile services or e-commerce services. Many crowd-funding
and crowd-investing platforms similarly rely on the data provided by their 
customers to liaise with financial providers in the supply of loans or capital. 
Finally, a few start-ups have begun to offer financial services to unbanked 
individuals simply by elaborating data from social media platforms and
mobile operators. 
The international cooperation challenge affecting FinTech firms and, to
a lesser extent traditional firms, is the tendency seen in certain key financial
jurisdictions to limit the flow of data.134 For instance, according to the new
E.U. General Data Protection Regulation, financial firms are required to geo-
localize data and are allowed to transfer it outside of the E.U. through 
specific model clauses or to those countries with which specific agreements
on privacy protection exist.135 In China, the Great Firewall has prevented the
use of a number of foreign applications that are considered a threat to 
national security, some of them indirectly connected to financial services.
Other great users of geo-localization are India, Indonesia, Russia, and 
Vietnam, which constitute around twenty-five percent of the world’s 
population.136 Moreover, the regulatory framework applicable to the use of
cloud services, an increasingly fundamental issue for banks, consistently
varies among jurisdictions. This ultimately constitutes a barrier to trade for 
the international operations of financial institutions.137 
One of the biggest threats to global digital finance comes from the 
protectionist policies of certain countries against emerging FinTech giants 
coming from China. According to the “Made in China 2025” initiative,
China plans to become a tech giant by 2025, and FinTech is one of the key
areas of development. Alipay, WeChat, and AntFinancial are just a few
134. Alan Beattie, Data Protectionism: The Growing Menace to Global Business, FIN. TIMES (May
18, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/6f0f41e4-47de-11e8-8ee8-cae73aab7ccb. 
135. Jaime Vazquez & Martin Boer, Addressing Regulatory Fragmentation to Support a Cyber-
Resilient Global Financial Services Industry, INST. INT’L FIN. 4 (Apr. 2018).
 136. Beattie, supra note 134.
 137. See generally ASIA CLOUD COMPUTING ASS’N, ASIA’S FINANCIAL SERVICES: READY FOR THE 
CLOUD (2014) (discussing the struggle of Asia Pacific countries to adopt their financial regulations to 
cloud-service technologies).
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among the thousands of new firms offering financial services through 
internet and mobile platforms. At present, the Chinese market for e-
payments is the biggest in the world, with around 731 million users. The 
Chinese strategy relies heavily on the progressive expansion of its services
in foreign markets—chiefly among them, the rise of Huawei as a dominant 
player in the Telecom market and already the first supplier of 5G technology 
in Europe. In the Fintech sphere, the greatest expansion is Alipay, which 
already competes with local operators in Africa. In this context, a few 
countries have already voiced their distrust of Chinese Fintech providers, 
which are seen as too close to the Chinese government and thus potentially
able to use customers’ data for reasons other than the pure supply of service. 
Another potential challenge comes from the increased restrictions on 
crypto-assets and, more generally, blockchain-based assets. Unlike classical
platforms, blockchain is based on a decentralized ledger that connects users 
and servers located in different countries. Right now, regulators across the 
globe have very different approaches to the regulation of smart-contracts and
tokenized securities. For instance, the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Singaporean Monetary Authority have declared some 
blockchain token offerings as securities, which are subject to local disclosure 
and trading standards.138 In South Korea, they were declared illegal.139 If no 
regulatory convergence is achieved, blockchain offerings could either be 
limited to one country or risk being left in a dark frontier of cyberspace.
D. Fragmentation in International Payments 
Another problem of international cooperation concerns the 
fragmentation of the international payment system. The international 
payment system is the artery that makes the blood of finance flow. Like its 
domestic equivalent, it is based on a very complicated infrastructure made
of progressive layers of clearing and settlements arrangements, supported by 
additional key facilities provided by a few players, such as the Society for 
the Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), that
maintain a quasi-monopoly status in the provision of their service. The main
implication of this interdependent structure is that if one of the links in the 
chain of payment breaks, the payment transmission stops.140 
From a legal perspective, an international payment transaction rests on 
a series of private contractual arrangements between a few large banks that
agree to provide clearing and settlement services to each other and to their 
138. PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF CODE
102 (2018).
 139. Id.
 140. See JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 391–409 (2016).
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respective affiliates and customers to enable a cross-border payment
transaction. In jargon, this is called a correspondent banking relationship.
Under this arrangement, one bank—the correspondent—provides a deposit 
account and ancillary services to the other bank—the respondent—whose 
account is debited or credited when a transaction is operated. Correspondent
banking is fundamental for international payments, as it covers a large 
variety of financial flows, from trade finance, to retail payments, short-term
borrowing, and trading in foreign currency.141 Not all banks can exert the
role of correspondent, since, in many jurisdictions, access to the central bank 
payment system is reserved to large institutions. Moreover, since 
international payments are usually in one of the few reserve currencies— 
mostly the U.S. dollar, the euro, the yen, and the U.K. pound—international 
payments must pass through a clearing bank located in the jurisdiction where 
the currency is legal tender, essentially meaning one of the four largest 
financial centers. As such, correspondent banks in key financial centers play 
a disproportionately critical role in the functioning of the world payment 
landscape.
The IMF, the BIS Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructure, 
and the Financial Stability Board have reported a drastic decline in 
correspondent banking relationships since the global financial crisis.142 This
is the result of the decision of some banks in the United State, Europe, Japan,
and other western jurisdictions to restrict their correspondent banking 
relationship to a few banks, including certain central banks, in developing
and emerging economies.143 This has produced a number of problems in the
countries whose banks rely on those relationships. These include 
jurisdictions in the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, Asia-Pacific,
and Africa. Among the key problems are the higher cost of, or the actual 
impossibility of, obtaining trade finance for firms, difficulties in sending 
remittances, higher costs to perform basic financial transactions, denial of 
market access, and a general loss of business and investor confidence. The
cost of the withdrawal of correspondent banking relationships was large in 
Latin America, to the point of harming regional financial integration. The 
IMF reports that reduced access to the payment system for local banks hurt 
small- and medium-sized firms that could not get access to trade finance for 
their exports or would otherwise have to pay more for financing.144 
There are multiple reasons behind the banks’ withdrawal decisions. Yet 
141. Michaela Erbenová et al., The Withdrawal of Correspondent Banking Relationships: A Case 
for Policy Action 8 (IMF, Staff Discussion Note SDN/16/06, 2016).
 142. Id. at 6.
 143. Id. at 9–10.
144.   IMF, Financial Integration in Latin America, at 32 (Mar. 2016). 



















    
  





   
  
  
     
  
   
   
     
  
   
   
 
   
 
124 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 30:91
results from studies show that regulatory concerns are the key drivers behind 
those decisions.145 Since 2012, the Financial Action Task Force’s standards
on anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism 
(CFT) put a greater emphasis on banks’ risk assessment decisions with
regard to the origin of money and gave banks more responsibility to adopt 
risk-mitigating approaches.146 Similarly, the increased international
coordination on tax avoidance among OECD countries has shifted a lot of
the risks of tax compliance to financial institutions, which are under much
greater scrutiny regarding their clients’ funds. Banks, faced with increased 
regulatory risk and compliance costs, have taken a more cautious approach, 
often deciding to err on the side of caution and terminate correspondent 
banking with clients or jurisdictions where regulations are unclear, rather
than risking fines.147 For instance, trade finance provides very small margins
to banks and needs large volumes to be profitable. If the compliance costs 
outweigh the profits, then a bank has no option but to drop this line of 
business.148 
Moreover, since the global financial crisis, banks have been subject to 
much higher fines for regulatory violations, often up to billions of U.S.
dollars.149 In the context of payments, violations for AML-CFT regulations,
tax avoidance, and international sanctions have become a source of concern
for the banks’ compliance and risk departments, as the steep regulatory fines
can have a detrimental effect on the banks’ market position and overall 
profitability.150 Since the 1990s, the United Nations, the European Union,
145. See World Bank Group [WBG], Withdrawal From Correspondent Banking: Where, Why, And 
What To Do About It (Nov. 2015) (discussing a study with findings that banking authorities and large
banks withdrew due to level of risk, regulatory, and business related concerns); KPMG, GLOBAL ANTI-
MONEY LAUNDERING SURVEY 2014 36 (2014) (discussing study results showing regulatory 
considerations was the largest driver behind investment decisions); ECB, Ninth Survey On Correspondent
Banking In Euro (Feb. 2015) (discussing risk considerations as a possible reason for decline in
correspondent banking relationships); Erbenová et al., supra note 141, at 19–27 (discussing regulatory 
obligations and enhanced enforcement as a driver for withdrawal of correspondent banking relationships).
 146. See generally Financial Action Task Force, International Standards on Combating Money 
Laundering and The Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation (2012) (discussing comprehensive measures
that countries should implement to combat money laundering and terrorist financing).
 147. CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING POLICIES FOR POOR COUNTRIES 12–13 (2015).
 148. Staci Warden, Casualties of War: The Unintended Consequences of America’s Financial 
Weapon of Mass Destruction, MILIKEN INST. REV. 22, 29 (2015).
149. For instance, in 2014, a U.S. court found BNP Paribas in violation of U.S. law for having
bypassed U.S. sanctions on behalf of Cuban, Iranian, and Sudanese clients and was forced to pay 8.9
billion U.S. dollars in forfeitures and fines. See Caroline Binham & Jim Pickard, Value of UK Financial 
Sanctions Breaches Rises to £1.4bn from £117m, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.ft.com/
content/97056714-18b8-11e8-9e9c-25c814761640.
150. In 2014, Credit Suisse agreed to pay 2.6 billion U.S. dollars for having helped clients to evade 
US tax law.
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and the United States have increasingly used sanctions to combat the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and the financing of terrorism in a number 
of countries and have shifted most of the burden onto banks who must 
implement market blockage on the targeted firms. The sanctioning regime
not only covers the banks headquartered or operating in the sanctioning
jurisdiction, but also extend to all foreign affiliates and clients. In certain
cases, the extraterritorial effect of sanctions is such that even banks that are
not directly linked to the sanctioning jurisdiction are nonetheless subject to 
them.151 Famous in this regard is the extraterritorial application of U.S. tax 
law, which requires all banks to disclose U.S. clients. Even in those cases,
the fear of sanctions has led banks to terminate the correspondent banking
with respondent banks in “hot” jurisdictions or that nonetheless would have 
posed a greater compliance risk.152 
Exemplary in this regard is the May 2018 decision of the United States 
to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal negotiated with the European Union 
and Russia in 2015.153 As a consequence of the Iran deal, SWIFT—the
world-leading payment provider—will be forced to suspend any dealing with 
Iranian banks by November 2018.154 This means that not only will Iranian
banks and their operations abroad be prevented from executing their 
payments through the SWIFT network, but also that, more crucially, all 
worldwide financial institutions dealing with Iran will be prevented from 
transferring money towards financial firms.  In case of non-compliance, 
SWIFT would be subject to a barrage of countermeasures which target both
the company’s board members and the financial institutions that employ
them. 
E. Central Bank Independence under Threat? 
Central bank independence is (almost) unanimously considered a 
prerequisite for a stable monetary policy. In its broadest sense, it means that
the design and implementation of the monetary policy is shielded from 
political interferences. Instead, the task of setting the interest rate and any
other tool normally associated with monetary policy is given to a state
agency, usually the central bank, which enjoys statutory guarantees of 
151. See ORDE F. KITTRIE, LAWFARE: LAW AS A WEAPON OF WAR (2016) (detailing examples of 
banks that have been subjected to sanctions with no direct link to the sanctioning jurisdiction). See also
Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The New Financial Extraterritoriality, 87 GEO. WASHINGTON L. REV. 239 (2019)
(discussing the financial criminal extraterritoriality doctrine of United States courts).
 152. Warden, supra note 148, at 28–29.
153. Sam Fleming & Katrina Manson, Donald Trump Pulls US Out of Iran Nuclear Deal, FIN. TIMES
(May 8, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/fb369232-52d1-11e8-b3ee-41e0209208ec. 
154. Michael Peel & Jim Brunsden, SWIFT Shows Impact of Iran Dispute on International Business, 
FIN. TIMES (June 5, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/9f082a96-63f4-11e8-90c2-9563a0613e56. 
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independence from political power. 
Many economists have weighed in on the reasons for this peculiar 
status.155 Economic theory suggests a direct link between price stability and 
the credibility of central banks.156 The political economy of electoral cycles
is such that politicians will face incentives to attain short-term political 
objectives by compromising long-term goals, and the same can be said for
any type of government that requires external consensus.157 In the context of 
monetary policy, this often entails the printing of money to address 
unemployment, currency manipulation to boost exports and regain a short-
term positive balance of payment, the purchase of government debt, or a
government-friendly bank supervisory policy.158 In this light, insulating the
design and implementation of monetary policy from political interferences 
boosts the credibility of the central bank and is perceived favorably by
financial markets as it reduces the risk of myopic policies. Evidence indeed 
suggests that countries with independent central banks have relatively lower 
inflation rates and more stable growth.159 For this reason, the statutes of 
many central banks in the world now envisage independence as one of the 
key requisites for an effective monetary policy.160 
For over three decades, a general consensus formed among 
policymakers and economists on the benefits of central bank 
independence.161 This can be seen by the steady increase in the number of 
155. See Alex Cukierman et al., Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on 
Policy Outcome, 6 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 353 (1992) (discussing the importance of the central bank
as an agency that mandates the maintenance of price stability); Vittorio Grilli et al., Political and 
Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries, 13 ECON. POL’Y 341 
(1991) (discussing study results of central bank independence effects irrespective of political institutions). 
156. Robert Barro & David Gordon, Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary
Policy, 12 J. MONETARY ECON. 101, 102 (1983).
157. Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of 
Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON. 473 (1977).
 158. See Alberto Alesina, Macroeconomics and Politics, in 3 NBER MACROECONOMIC ANN. 13 
(Stanley Fischer ed., 1988) (discussing how central bank independence affects political influence on 
economy and monetary policy). 
159. See Alberto Alesina & Lawrence Summers, Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic 
Performance: Some Comparative Evidence, 25 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 151 (1993) (discussing
study results that showed monetary discipline associated with central bank independence resulted in lower 
inflation).
 160. For recent surveys, see Ana C. Garriga, Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data 
Set, 42 INT’L INTERACTIONS 849 (2016) (discussing a study of multiple countries and statutory reforms
affecting central bank independence); Ashraf Khan, Central Bank Legal Frameworks In The Aftermath
Of The Global Financial Crisis (IMF, Working Paper No. 17/101, 2017) (discussing changes to central 
bank laws after the global financial crisis).
161. Christopher Crowe & Ellen E. Meade, Central Bank Independence and Transparency: 
Evolution and Effectiveness 4 (IMF, Working Paper No. 08/119, 2008) (arguing that the acceptance of 
central bank independence has increased since it began being seriously measured in the 1980s). 
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countries that have changed the statutes of their central bank or their 
domestic laws to guarantee independence.162 Yet in the last few years and in 
many parts of the world, we have witnessed attacks on the legitimacy of
central bankers’ monetary policy decisions or explicit attempts to reduce or 
eliminate their independence.
In the United States, Donald Trump constantly attacked the Federal 
Reserve for its interest rate decisions.163  In the European Union, the
European Central Bank has been under fire from all sides of the populist 
spectrum—from Italy and Greece to Germany and Austria—over its
monetary policy tightening or its decisions to finance defaulting countries 
during the sovereign debt crisis.164  In the United Kingdom, Brexiteers have
constantly criticized the Bank of England for its allegedly “scaremongering” 
tactics and biased forecasts on the Brexit economic scenario.165 In Hungary,
Victor Orbán has, more than any other western leader, placed financial 
nationalism and the undermining of the National Bank of Hungary’s
independence at the center of his populist economic agenda.166 Attacks on 
central bank independence are not exclusive to western democracies. In
India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has tried to invoke a small clause on
the Reserve Bank of India’s statute allowing the government to provide
direction, “when necessary in the public interest,” to get exemptions for
power companies and to influence credit growth in the economy.167 In 
Turkey, President Recep Tayipp Erdogan, a long-term skeptic of the
standard interest rates policy, clashed openly with the Turkish Central Bank 
for not helping the Turkish economy in the wake of the emerging market 
monetary crisis that hit Turkey in the summer of 2018.168 
162. Garriga, supra note 160; Khan, supra note 160.
 163. Peter Wells, Trump Describes FED as His “Biggest Threat,”  FIN. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/798bbcae-d19c-11e8-a9f2-7574db66bcd5. 
164. Claire Jones, Draghi Launches Defence of Central Banks Over Political Heat, FIN. TIMES (Oct.
26, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/ddc8aabe-d92c-11e8-a854-33d6f82e62f8. 
165. Joe Murphy & Nicholas Cecyl, Boris Johnson Clashes with Bank of England Chief Over
Whether Britain Can Strike a Deal to Continue Free Trade with EU After Brexit, EVENING STANDARD
(June 25, 2019), https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/boris-johnson-clashes-with-bank-of-england-
chief-over-whether-britain-can-strike-a-deal-to-continue-a4175296.html; Katie Weston, Former Farage
Advisor Attacks Mark Carney for Scaremongering the Public, EXPRESS (Sept. 14, 2018),
https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1017633/bank-of-england-governor-mark-carney-house-prices-
brexit-no-deal-brexit-brexit-news. 
166.  Johnson & Barnes, supra note 31, at 547–49.
 167. Devesh Kapur, The Battle between India’s Central Bank and the Government Has Deep Roots, 
FIN. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/d50a1150-debe-11e8-b173-ebef6ab1374a.
 168. Onur Ant, Erdogan Says that His Patience on Central Bank Policy Has Limits, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-14/erdogan-says-his-
patience-on-central-bank-policy-has-limits. 
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V. WHAT LIES BEHIND FINANCIAL NATIONALISM? 
The previous section showed that financial nationalism is indeed rising,
albeit in disguise and in different forms. The objective of this section is to
analyze, from a theoretical perspective, the possible explanations for this 
phenomenon. To do so, I will first introduce the main approaches of the 
analysis of financial nationalism, and then discuss how they could be applied
to recent trends. 
A. Theoretical Approaches to Financial Nationalism 
Unlike international trade theory, there is no general economic model 
of international finance that considers the domestic distributional effects of
financial protectionism and its welfare costs.169 Moreover, given the
different forms and regulatory strategies used in financial nationalism, it
would be nearly impossible to group them together under a single 
comprehensive theory. Yet economists and political scientists have usually 
adapted trade theories and political economic models to account for the 
specificities of finance. In this section, I will discuss two main approaches:
the economics of international finance and the political economy of 
regulatory cooperation.
1. Economics of Financial Globalization 
The starting point for any discussion on financial globalization must be
the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theorem. The fundamental postulate of this
model is that a country will export the commodity that relies on the use of 
abundant and cheap factors of production and import those commodities that 
require the use of expensive and scarce factors.170  In this context, financial
globalization will primarily benefit those countries that have a strong 
financial sector such as the United States, Japan, or the European Union. 
Indeed, banks will be able to export their services abroad and exploit
economies of scale and scope. Yet analyzing international finance from a 
pure trade perspective is limiting, as it does not consider the effects of
international finance from the import or capital inflow side. 
The literature on financial globalization is mixed as to whether financial
liberalization is a blessing or a curse. The standard economics account of 
financial globalization argues that, in principle, international capital flows 
bring positive effects to the domestic economy. The neoclassical growth 
model of an international economy predicts that capital will flow where 
169. Edmund J. Malesky, Interest Group Politics, in  HANDBOOK OF SAFEGUARDING GLOBAL
FINANCIAL (Gerard Caprio, Jr. et al. eds., 2013) (stating the three theories currently underpinning
“existing political economic theory”). 
170. DOMINICK SALVATORE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 83 (1st ed. 2004).
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interest rates are higher.171 Financial openness allows a more efficient 
allocation of capital, thus reducing the cost of capital for firms and 
individuals and increasing productivity. Firms will be able to exploit interest
rate differentials and access a wider variety of products – for instance, by 
issuing securities in a foreign exchange. For the same reason, a number of
studies have associated open financial systems with increased growth, 
especially in developing economies.172 Moreover, financial liberalization 
brings the usual effects associated with free trade and competition.173 
Financial firms will specialize according to their comparative advantage and 
offer a better service tailored to the needs of customers. Increased pressure
from incumbent firms will reduce rent-seeking activities and drive inefficient
firms out of the market. International investment will induce technology and 
skills transfers, especially when large and sophisticated global banks or 
investment firms operate through permanent establishments. 
These theories, however, cannot explain why regulators sometimes 
decide to maintain or return to a closer capital account. There is a large 
amount of literature that associates financial openness with economic and
financial crisis. As Jagdish Bhagwati famously said, “trading in widget and
trading in dollars is not the same.”174 There is unequivocal evidence that 
premature capital account opening without a robust macroeconomic
framework can exacerbate risks and lead to monetary crash.175 Indeed, in 
their canonical book on sovereign debt crises, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth 
Rogoff show that waves of financial globalization almost always coincide 
with widespread banking crises.176 Without strong financial supervisory and
171. See  DARON ACEMOGLU, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN ECONOMIC GROWTH 26–76 (2009) 
(discussing the solow growth model).
 172. See generally R.G. King & Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be Right, 
108 Q.J. ECON. 717 (1993) (discussing study of eighty countries with evidence of the financial system
promoting economic growth); Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and 
Agenda, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 688 (1997) (discussing evidence that showed a functioning financial 
system led to economic growth); Laura Alfaro et al., Foreign Bank Entry and Entrepreneurship
(Columbia Univ., Working Paper, 2015) (discussing study of forty-six countries and thirty-six industries
with evidence of foreign bank presence fostering business formation). 
173. For an overview, see MASAMICHI KONO ET AL., OPENING MARKETS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AND THE ROLE OF THE GATS 17–23 (1998) (explaining that liberalization has led to increased competition 
forcing companies to seek cheaper ways to finance activities); WBG, Global Financial Development
Report 2017/2018: Bankers Without Borders, at 21–25 (2018),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/28482/9781464811487.pdf (discussing
the risks of openness of international banking).
 174. Bhagwati, supra note 67.
175. For an overview, see KONO ET AL., supra note 173, at 23–26 (1998); COMM. ON INT’L ECON.
POL’Y AND REFORM, BANKS AND CROSS-BORDER CAPITAL FLOWS: POLICY CHALLENGES AND
REGULATORY RESPONSES (2012) (explaining the unintended consequences of capital account
liberalization that result from the procyclicality in capital flows going unaddressed). 
176. REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 46, at 157. 
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regulatory frameworks, domestic financial systems can similarly be under
stress and unable to manage the stability of the local financial system. For
instance, experience shows that small and underdeveloped financial systems 
have difficulty coping with cross-border banking crises, as they lack the
supervisory and financial resources to deal with a bank in distress. More
recent studies have also challenged the liberalization-growth nexus, 
questioning the entire foundation of financial globalization for 
development.177  Moreover, there is a new wealth of evidence showing a
direct correlation between financial globalization and inequality, albeit the 
precise reasons are still unclear.178 
Financial nationalism can be explained by the desire of regulators to
protect themselves against the dangers of international finance, whenever the
risks of globalization seem to outweigh its benefits. For instance, most of the
episodes of capital controls since the 1997 South Asian financial crisis can
be explained by the need to protect monetary and financial stability.179 
Capital controls have passed through various phases of acceptance and
rejection by the academic and policy communities.180 As of today, they are
tepidly accepted by the international financial community when necessary to
curb sudden capital inflows under specific macroeconomic circumstances. 
On the contrary, controls on the outflow of capital are still seen as the last 
resort to tame a pending crisis and are openly rejected as bad policies under 
all other circumstances.181  Similarly, ring-fencing, another form of capital 
control, is sometimes justified by the need of regulators to prevent assets
redistributions within the consolidated banking group that affect the financial 
177. See Barry Eichengreen, Capital Account Liberalization: What Do the Cross-Country Studies
Tell Us?, 15 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 341 (2001) (discussing the controversy of capital account
liberalization through theoretical perspectives and lack of conclusive empirical analysis); Ayhan Kose et
al., Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal, 56 IMF STAFF PAPERS 8 (2009) (analyzing the effects of
capital account liberalization and noting the lack of robust evidence of growth benefits); Eswar Prasad et
al., Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence 23–37 (IMF, 
Occasional Paper No. 220, 2003) (discussing theoretical and observed effects of financial globalization 
and economic growth).
178. For an overview, see Florence F. Jaumotte et al., Rising Income Inequality: Technology, Or 
Trade and Financial Globalization?, 61 IMF ECON. REV. 271 (2013); Rodrik, Populism and the 
Economics of Globalization, supra note 2; Davide Furceri et al., The Aggregate and Distributional Effects
of Financial Globalization: Evidence from Macro and Sectoral Data (IMF, Working Paper No. 18/83,
2018); Davide Furceri & Prakash Loungani, Capital Account Liberalization and Inequality (IMF,
Working Paper No.15/243, 2015).
 179. See Monetary and Capital Markets Dep’t et al., Liberalizing Capital Flows and Managing
Outflows 27, 33–34, 37–38 (Mar. 13, 2012) (discussing examples of use of capital controls since 1997).
 180. See generally Ghosh & Qureshi, supra note 50 (discussing the history of the use of capital 
controls). 
181. See, e.g., IMF, The Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows: An Institutional View
25–26, 36 (2012) (recommending that the Directors of the IMF endorse such a view as the IMF’s
institutional view). 
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stability of the local foreign affiliate.182 
2. Interest Group Theories 
Neoclassical economics provided a fertile ground for a set of political 
economy theories, including explaining the role of political and economic 
actors in the process of financial liberalization. Formal economic models of
domestic policies started to develop as a mainstream discipline with Kenneth
Arrow’s “impossibility theorem” in the 1950s.183 This branch uses
neoclassical economics to explain how different social preferences lead to
specific political decisions.184 Within the area of social choice theory, 
interest group theories use a rationalist approach to discern which domestic
and foreign lobby groups will push for, or resist, a specific political 
process.185 
In the field of international economics, interest group theories were first 
used to explain trade preferences.186 Towards the early 1990s, interest group
theories were adopted in international finance.187 Ronald Rogowski argued
that the decision to open domestic financial markets in the 1970s was due to
two combining factors.188 First, the need of domestic industries to access 
cheaper sources of capital, which led them to lobby their own governments 
to loosen the restrictions on the controls of capital flows, thus paving the way 
for the subsequent waves of financial integration. Secondly, rising incomes 
and increased savings changed the median voter’s preference towards lower
inflation and increased availability of investment opportunities.189 According
to this account, governments will liberalize the financial sector as long as the 
political power of interest groups favoring globalization is higher than that 
of opposing interest groups. This explains why the United States and the 
182.  D’Hulster & Otker-Robe, supra note 119, at 4. 
183. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951) (setting 
out the “impossibility theorem”).
 184. See generally ALLAN M. FELDMAN & ROBERTO SERRANO, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL
CHOICE THEORY (2d ed. 2006) (focusing on welfare economics and social choice theory); WULF
GAERTNER, A PRIMER IN SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY (2006) (introducing social choice theory).
 185. See KOTARO SUZUMARA, RATIONAL CHOICE, COLLECTIVE DECISIONS, AND SOCIAL WELFARE
1–6 (1983) (introducing the author’s rationalization theory).
 186. See EDWARD MANSFIELD & HELEN V. MILNER, VOTES, VETOES, AND THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 37 (2012) (discussing early interest group theories).
See generally RONALD ROGOWSKI, COMMERCE AND COALITIONS (1989) (comparing the effects of
interest groups in different countries on trade preferences). 
187. See generally Jeffry A. Frieden, Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies
in a World of Global Finance, 45 INT’L ORG. 425, 442–51 (1991) (discussing how interest group activity 
would likely change).
 188. ROGOWSKI, supra note 186.
 189. Andrew Walter, Understanding Financial Globalization in International Political Economy, in
GLOBALIZING INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 141, 156 (Nicola Philips ed., 2005). 
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United Kingdom started to liberalize earlier in the 1970s, and why Latin
American and Asian countries liberalized later due to their need to attract 
more foreign direct investments. 
The same theories also explain how the increased economic influence 
of the financial sector in the 1980s led to huge lobbying pressure by banking 
conglomerates on OECD countries to actively promote the dismantling of
the remaining barriers of financial integration. Banks in the United States,
United Kingdom, and continental Europe started to feel the need to expand
their reach across borders to increase economies of scale and increase profits.
Notwithstanding their desire to expand, they still faced considerable 
administrative and regulatory barriers in a number of countries, as local 
financial institutions—sometimes under the financial controls of the 
government—had the lion’s share of the domestic market. This led to a clash
between export-oriented financial firms supported by capital-intensive
industries requiring cheaper funding and local domestic-oriented firms 
suffering from foreign competition. In this situation, unilateral liberalization
was not feasible. For this reason, the process of financial liberalization had 
to rely on an international regulatory platform—the WTO GATS—to
facilitate the economic bargain between domestic and exporting financial 
industries of WTO members.190 
A number of scholars have applied interest group theory to the issue of 
international regulatory and policy cooperation in finance.191 In his work on
the Basel Capital Accord, David Singer argues that regulators face a double 
pressure when agreeing to international regulatory standards.192 Regulators
need to strike a balance between maintaining the competitiveness of 
domestic firms while guaranteeing the safety of the financial system. In an 
open global financial market, regulatory unilateralism does not work, as the
optimal domestic regulatory win-set might mean loss of market share against 
less regulated firms. In this situation, the only option is to strike a deal among
national regulators that guarantees a level playing field among countries. 
This is precisely what occurred during the 1980s, when U.S. and U.K. 
regulators suffering from competition of less-regulated Japanese banks
decided to push for a global standard on capital adequacy for banks.193 
190. See WENDY DOBSON & PIERRE JACQUET, FINANCIAL SERVICES LIBERALIZATION IN THE WTO 
95–101 (1998) (discussing the role of GATS and the WTO in promoting financial liberalization).
 191. See, e.g., Beth A. Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital
Market Regulation, 55 INT’L ORG. 589 (2001) (focusing on harmonization processes); Andrew Walter,
Adopting International Financial Standards in Asia: Convergence or Divergence in the Global Political
Economy?, in GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION THIRTY YEARS ON 95 (Geoffret Undergill et al. eds.,
2010) (focusing on the case study of Asia).
 192. SINGER, supra note 7, at 22. 
193. Id. at 49–62.
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Stavros Gadinis provides a political economy framework to understand when 
coordination works. He argues that, in an open global financial market, 
coordination depends on the strength and weakness of countries as dominant
or weak financial centers. Whether coordination works depends on the 
willingness of market players to access a given foreign market, the strength
of the dominant center, and the willingness of states to compromise on
regulatory freedom in order to get market access abroad.194 
Other authors have provided political economy models that explain
coordination problems in cross-border banking supervision and resolution.195 
The main theory is that cross-border banking is affected by principal-agent
problems that prevent national supervisory agencies from cooperating 
whenever it is not in the national interest. This occurs at any stage of the
supervisory process, from the refusal of supervisors to share supervisory data
due to the fear of immediate reactions from the foreign counterpart to the 
moment of declaration of insolvency.196 Federico Lupo-Pasini extends this
model to the resolution phase, showing that the same conflict of incentives
often prevents resolution authorities from adopting a globally-optimal 
resolution strategy whenever the costs of cooperation outweigh the benefits 
in terms of fiscal expenditure or creditor protection.197 
In his political economy model of capital controls, Gunter Schulze 
theorizes that capital controls on the outflow of capital—more precisely, a 
tax on capital exports—benefit those who have less capital, namely, labor-
intensive industries and workers. In a democracy, capital controls will be 
194. See Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in International Financial Regulation, 49 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 447, 503 (2008) (discussing an example in which the United States strongly dominates
a market).
 195. See, e.g., CROSS-BORDER BANKING: REGULATORY CHALLENGES (Gerard Caprio, Jr. et al. eds., 
2006) (compiling various experts and regulators’ models); CLAESSENS ET AL., supra note 79 (arguing for 
a modified universal, not territorial, approach); INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTABILITY: GLOBAL
BANKING AND NATIONAL REGULATION (Douglas D. Evanoff et al. eds., 2007) (including discussion of
cross-border contagion links, currency crises, and hedge funds); SCHOENMAKER, supra note 78, at 115– 
29 (discussing the political economy of international governance); Kathia D’Hulster, Cross Border 
Banking Supervision: Incentive Conflicts in Supervisory Information Sharing between Home and Host 
Supervisors (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 5871, 2011) (focusing on obstacles to
supervisory information sharing between countries).
196. Piotr Bednarski & Grzegorz Bielicki, Home and Host Supervisors’ Relations from a Host 
Supervisor’s Perspective, in CROSS-BORDER BANKING: REGULATORY CHALLENGES 211 (Gerard Caprio, 
Jr. et al. eds., 2006) (discussing sovereignty and jurisdictional issues); Eric Rosengren, An Overview of
Cross-Border Bank Policy Issues, in CROSS-BORDER BANKING: REGULATORY CHALLENGES 465 (Gerard
Caprio, Jr. et al. eds., 2006) (regarding reactions to solvency issues); Richard J. Herring, Conflicts
Between Home & Host Country Prudential Supervisors 10–14 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr, Wharton Sch., U. 
of Pa., Working Paper, 2007); Martin Schüler, Incentive Problems in Banking Supervision: The European
Case (Ctr. for Eur. Econ. Res., Discussion Paper No. 03-62, 2003) (focusing on Europe).
 197. LUPO-PASINI, supra note 6, at 90–118; see also SCHOENMAKER, supra note 78.
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implemented if the median voter has a relatively low capital-to-labor ratio.198 
The likelihood of capital controls on the outflow is increased in a situation 
of high unemployment to preserve national income, as capital outflows are
considered to aggravate unemployment.199 In a different set of models (this
time focused on inflows), various scholars argue that capital controls in the
forms of small Pigouvian taxes on the inflow of capital are optimal when
adopted for prudential reasons. The argument is that, since international 
investors do not internalize the externalities of their portfolio investments in
terms of rising domestic inflation, bubbles, or short-term vision, taxes on the 
inflow of capital would force them to bear the costs of their investment for
the domestic economy.200 
B. Analysis of the Current Nationalistic Trend 
In light of the above, what could possibly explain the rise of nationalism 
in finance? Based on these assumptions, the sections below sketch a basic
analysis of the reasons behind this trend. There are five model scenarios: 1) 
regulatory unilateralism, 2) ring-fencing, 3) extraterritoriality, 4) digital 
protectionism, and 5) central bank independence. 
1. Regulatory Unilateralism 
The literature on regulatory coordination in finance stresses that 
national regulators do have an interest in cooperating on financial standards. 
Regulatory differences constitute barriers to trade for exporting firms and, 
therefore, imply lost revenues. In addition, capital-intensive industries, as 
well as domestic investors, need to tap into global markets for cheaper
sources of capital. Hence, from a coordination viewpoint, the difficulty lies 
in finding a common ground, rather than in enforcing compliance.201 
In a closed economy, regulators will set their regulatory perimeter of
intervention in a limited zone of acceptance. This will be determined by the
political tradeoff between the needs of different interest groups. The
literature on capital adequacy standards suggests that domestic banks will 
favor low regulatory capital to maximize returns, while depositors will favor 
the opposite to minimize risks of instability.202 Depending on the relative
198. See generally  GUNTHER G. SCHULZE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CAPITAL CONTROLS 
(2000) (discussing government incentives for imposing restrictions on international capital movements). 
199. Id.
200.  See generally OLIVIER JEANNE ET. AL, WHO NEEDS TO OPEN THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT? (2012)
(discussing the development of open capital accounts); IMF, Capital Inflows: The Role of Controls 9 
(IMF, Staff Position Note SPN/10/04, 2010) (discussing the impact of taxes on capital flows). 
201. See generally  LUPO-PASINI, supra note 6 (discussing the successes and failures of various 
international law regimes in protecting financial sovereignty). 
202. SINGER, supra note 7, at 53–56.
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political weight of those groups, regulators will choose a regulatory standard 
somewhere in between. In an open economy, however, two additional
interest groups play a role. First, domestic banks with global ambitions will 
need the support of their government to access foreign markets and they will 
favor policies that reduce barriers to investment. Second, domestic investors 
or capital-intensive industries will push for policies that attract foreign 
banks, as this will reduce their costs of credit.  Since capital is mobile in an 
open economy, regulators will have to find a win-set that is neither too high 
to discourage international investors, nor too low to put financial stability in
jeopardy. As Andrew Singer convincingly argues, when regulators are under 
pressure from less-regulated foreign firms, they will push for international 
regulatory harmonization.203 
What explains a return of regulatory unilateralism then? At the outset, 
regulatory unilateralism plays a role only in key financial centers such as the
United States and the European Union, which are rule-makers rather than 
rule-takers. There is ample literature demonstrating that except for members 
of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, countries are constrained 
by their supervisory capacity in adopting more stringent regulations.204 One
possible explanation is that the relative power of globally active banks (or 
their appetite for expansion) is reduced while, at the same time, big financial
centers have enough market size to satisfy the needs of domestic capital-
intensive industries. The decreased level of political support for regulatory 
convergence pushes the regulatory win-set closer to what it would have been
in a situation of domestic equilibrium. In this case, it is interesting to see that
we are not witnessing a race to the bottom, but rather a retrenchment towards
closed economy. Capital-intensive industries and savers will be the interest 
group losing out from this situation, as they will experience higher costs of 
financing.
2. Ring-Fencing
Cross-border banking presents very different coordination problems
from regulatory standards. The literature on cross-border banking crises 
shows that, while the institutional mechanisms of coordination (mostly
through Memoranda of Understanding or Colleges of Supervisors) are, in 
principle, easy to set up, implementation is the problem. In the event of a 
crisis, domestic pressure mounts on supervisors not to cooperate with their 
foreign counterparts. To avoid capital flights, supervisors will forbear 
sharing data on the local bank with foreign supervisors. During resolution, 
203. See generally id. (providing a survey of regulators’ reactions to pressures). 
204. Emily Jones & Alexandra Zeitz, The Limits of Globalizing Basel Banking Standards, 3 J. FIN.
REG. 89, 105–11 (2017).
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supervisors will try to maximize domestic interest by ring-fencing assets or
by refusing to fund the resolution of the foreign bank.205 
Why do bank supervisors enter into agreements that they are unable to 
implement under stress? One explanation is that the interest groups that are 
vocal in setting up cooperation mechanisms—globally active banks—are the 
same that lobby for protection at the very first sign of crisis. In addition, 
lobby groups that were absent in the negotiation stage, depositors and
domestic investors, will be extremely vocal in requesting protection. This 
changes considerably the payoffs for resolution authorities as they will be 
subject to intense pressure. 
One of the key lessons from the global financial crises was that
controlling the stability of a cross-border bank in its consolidated structure 
is impossible, unless the home and host supervisors attain the maximum 
level of cooperation. Experience demonstrates that this is almost impossible
to achieve in reality, as the politics of finance will inevitably intrude and 
push for the protection of national interests.206 As theorized by Dirk 
Schoenmaker in his financial trilemma, states that want to maintain a stable 
financial system have to choose between either: 1) giving up financial 
sovereignty by transferring supervisory powers over international banks to 
an international supervisory authority or 2) giving up the benefits of
international banking by adopting a national supervisory and regulatory
framework that limits capital mobility within the banking group.207 
Geographical ring-fencing is precisely the latter option.
Since the crisis, we have witnessed that geographical ring-fencing is 
used not as a crisis measure, but rather as a permanent feature of the local
supervisory system. Subsidiarization changes the landscape of global 
finance, as it reduces considerably capital mobility. From a political 
economy perspective, moving towards a host-country model shows that the 
political costs of coordination are factored into the actual supervisory model. 
Thus, the voices of taxpayers and all other groups against supervisory
coordination are well-factored into the mode of financial liberalization— 
branch versus subsidiaries—and predominant over that of capital-intensive 
industries. Also, cross-border banks now seem to favor a subsidiary model, 
as it prevents them from suffering intra-group spillovers during a crisis. 
3. Extraterritoriality 
The vast political science and international political economy literature 
205. SCHOENMAKER, supra note 78, at 27–33.
 206. See generally  LUPO-PASINI, supra note 6 (discussing the successes and failures of various 
international law regimes in protecting financial sovereignty). 
207. SCHOENMAKER, supra note 78, at 18–32.
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on regulatory competition clearly show that “market power,” or “market
dominance,” is a fundamental driver of regulatory outcomes.208 
Extraterritoriality is one of the key expressions of such market power. By
expanding the scope of national jurisdiction to entities or deals that are 
geographically situated in a different territory, regulators expand their reach 
across national borders. Of course, because regulatory jurisdiction is 
different than judicial jurisdiction, the violation of the extraterritorial rule 
can be sanctioned—and, thus, is credible—only if the violating entity has 
presence in the jurisdiction or if it wished to access it in the future. In the
first case, sanctions will target the offices of the company, individuals linked 
to the company, or assets belonging to the company. In the second case, the 
threat of market access denial would be worrying enough to force 
compliance. The practice of using extraterritoriality as a regulatory strategy
has the effect of forcing companies to comply with an additional set of rules
that they would normally not be subjected to given their location. When
compliance with the extraterritorial rules is particularly costly or in conflict
with home rules, firms might have to choose between two competing
markets.209 This is what happened, for instance, in the four years’ war on the
regulation of OTC derivatives and central clearinghouses between the United 
States and the European Union.210 
Since the credibility of the threat is linked to the market power of the 
state, only dominant markets can engage in extraterritoriality. From an
economic viewpoint, they behave like a firm in a situation of monopolistic 
competition or monopsony. Like a single seller or buyer in a market, states 
enjoying a position of market dominance can impose on foreign entities their
decisions, knowing that there are no other options for their clients than taking 
them. From a political economy viewpoint, in dominant markets, the 
regulatory domestic and foreign win-sets are the same. Indeed, unlike other
scenarios discussed in this paper, the domestic political economy
equilibrium is not later affected by external market dynamics, such as threat
of market loss in third countries or reduced capital inflow. In a dominant 
market, globally active banks will not lose market access abroad, and foreign 
investors will have the same interest in moving into the country as before, 
208. See generally Nikhil Kalyanpur & Abraham L. Newman, Mobilizing Market Power: 
Jurisdictional Expansion as Economic Statecraft, 73 INT’L ORG. (2018) (arguing that a states’ ability to
protect its domestic firms is affected both by its economic strength and the strength of its political
institutions); Beth A. Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market 
Regulation, 55 INT’L ORG. 589 (2001) (discussing the need for political pressure from dominant financial 
centers for market regulation); Gadinis, supra note 194 (discussing an example in which the United States
strongly dominates a market). 
209. LUPO-PASINI, supra note 6, at 163–66.
 210. Id.
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since the appeal of the market is unchanged. Thus, the raising or lowering of
the regulatory perimeter at the domestic level is purely driven by domestic 
considerations. In the case of AML regulations, the United States benefits
from a position of almost total control as the dominance of the U.S. dollar as 
a global reserve currency means that any deal involving U.S. dollars must go 
through U.S. banks at some point. In turn, any bank that wants to deal with
international clients will have to establish a foot in the United States, either 
by establishing a branch or subsidiary, or by engaging a U.S. bank as its 
correspondent. 
4. Digital Protectionism 
Financial nationalism in FinTech manifests itself mainly in two ways. 
On the one hand, countries are increasingly engaged in a race to the bottom 
in regulatory and licensing policies to attract as many FinTech firms as
possible.211 On the other hand, countries impose controls on the flow of data
that act as import or export barriers. From a political economy viewpoint, it
is difficult to reconcile the two approaches, as they often conflict with each
other. Indeed, while tax exemptions or sandboxes act as domestic and export 
subsidies, thus lowering the cost of services, controls on the flow of data
increase the cost of production, as firms are required to operate as
independent companies from a data perspective. 
One way to reconcile these two opposite policies is to see them as two
facets of an infant industry policy. In trade policy, the infant industry
argument was used to justify protection to nascent industries against the 
threat coming from foreign competition. Import restrictions make foreign 
goods or services more expensive. This serves to give breathing space to
otherwise uncompetitive local domestic industries that can now grow to a
size where economies of scale would make them competitive. Like for all
forms of trade protectionism, the infant industry argument is mostly
contested by economists, as it produces heavy distortions.212 The rising costs
of goods or services translates to a deadweight loss for the nation, and often 
results in rent-seeking. On the other hand, other studies suggest that when 
certain preconditions are met—namely, the presence of dynamic learning 
effects external to firms, and the use of subsidies over tariffs or quotas— 
infant-industry protection might be less disruptive than usually
211. Jemima Kelly, A “FinTech Sandbox” Might Sound Like a Harmless Idea. It’s Not, FIN. TIMES
(Dec. 5, 2018), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/12/05/1543986004000/A—fintech-sandbox—might-
sound-like-a-harmless-idea—It-s-not/.
212. Robert E. Baldwin, The Case Against Infant-Industry Tariff Protection, 77 J. POL. ECON. 295,
304 (1969).
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considered.213 
5. Central Bank Independence 
There is an emerging literature on populism and central bank
independence. A few authors have suggested a relationship between the 
growing populist attacks against technocratic elites or experts and central 
banks.214  Indeed, given the statutory requirement of technical expertise for
central bank officers, at least at the Board level, and the obligation to set the 
monetary policy to attain specific macroeconomic goals but not others, most 
central bankers could be easily considered specialized technocrats. It is 
probably true that, on a more general level, pressure has arisen on agencies
to conform more with the populist governments. We can see this regarding 
environmental policy where the trade-off between industry’s goals and 
environmental protection is under constant battle.215 
The technocratic anger argument, nevertheless, has the merit of
highlighting what is probably the central problem with monetary policy and 
populism: the increased pressure on fiscal policy to stimulate growth and the 
effect on monetary stability. Since the global financial crisis, central banks 
have had to intervene with emergency measures to maintain the stability of
the financial sector, and in the Eurozone area, central banks had to bailout 
defaulting states. Both the bailout of financial institutions in the United
States and Europe and the debt restructuring interventions required for 
Greece, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal had major fiscal and distributional 
implications. At the domestic level, taxpayers’ money had to be sacrificed to 
bailout insolvent banks, sparking a backlash against the financial sector,
exemplified by the “Occupy Wall Street” movement in the United States. At
the Eurozone level, where the very opposite problem occurred, the absence
of fiscal solidarity prevented a timely resolution of the sovereign debt crisis, 
thus leading to a revolt against European institutions by southern European 
states.216 
The need for central banks to adopt unconventional monetary policies 
to address low inflation and the augmented scope of central bank 
213. Marc J. Melitz, When and How Should Infant Industries Be Protected?, 66 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
177, 178 (2005).
 214. WILLEM BUITER, DYSFUNCTIONAL CENTRAL BANKING: THE END OF INDEPENDENT CENTRAL
BANKS OR A RETURN TO ‘NARROW CENTRAL BANKING’ – OR BOTH? (2016).
215. In the United States, President Trump has openly challenged the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency on its stance on climate change. 
216. See generally Federico Lupo-Pasini, Economic Stability and Economic Governance in the Euro 
Area: What the European Crisis Can Teach on the Limits of Economic Integration, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L.
211 passim (2013) (discussing the difficulty of using international law to maintain economic stability in
light of the recent European economic crisis).
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interventions with macro-prudential tools also contributed greatly to the
clash with governments.217 Both quantitative easing and macroprudential 
policy have fundamental distributional implications; the latter because it
influences directly, and more than any other previous tool, the price of
houses and corporate assets218 and the former because in a situation of
economic integration, such as in the European Union, de facto is interpreted
as a promise to buy the sovereign debt of individual member states.219 
Charles Goodhart and Rosa Lastra have recently argued that tensions 
between populist governments and central banks will only increase over
time.220 While the latter will focus on their statutory goal of price stability, 
politicians will try to pressure for faster growth.221 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
After a period of almost forty years of progressive cooperation in
financial regulation, we are now potentially entering a new phase of relative 
disengagement in international financial relations. The slowdown in the pace 
and level of financial integration since 2008, the global systemic risks 
inherent in the life of global systematically important banks, the rise of 
populist and nationalist parties in many countries, and a looming economic 
war for technological supremacy between China and the United States have 
all contributed to a change in the appetite for cooperation. This Article has 
discussed some of the recent phenomena of financial nationalism around the 
world, from the regulatory conflicts around Brexit between the European 
Union and the United Kingdom to the open distrust against the Chinese 
FinTech giants’ expansion by Western regulators. It is too early to judge 
whether these episodes constitute a clear change in international financial
policymaking that will remain with us for the foreseeable future or mere 
epiphenomena of contingent political and economic scenarios. The history
of finance has showed that global markets do need global rules, even if they
217. Jakob de Haan et al., Central Bank Independence Before and After the Crisis, 60 COMP. ECON.
STUD. 183, 192–200 (2018).
 218. Fernández-Albertos, The Politics of Central Bank Independence, 18 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 217,
232 (2015) (concluding that the actions taken by any independent central banks are inescapably 
distributive); see also de Haan et al., supra note 217, at 195 (stating that “macro-prudential and 
unconventional monetary policies” have distributional consequences and explaining how this would work
in the real estate sector).
 219. James Bullard, Central View: The Global Battle Over Central Bank Independence, FED.
RESERVE BANK ST. LOUIS (2013), https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/central-banker/spring-from-
the-president/speeches-and-presentations/2013/the-global-battle-over-central-bank-independence; see 
also Goodhart & Lastra, supra note 3, at 52 (discussing quantitative easing in the context of 
globalization).
220.  Goodhart & Lastra, supra note 3, at 51.
 221. Id.
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fall short of the complex and binding framework found in other fields of 
economic relations. Unless politicians around the world will fully turn their 
back to the promise of global finance, which seems unlikely, a minimum 
level of cooperation will always remain. Yet, in the last century, we have 
witnessed too many times how the populist rhetoric against financial markets
and distrust against foreigners can quickly escalate to full economic chaos.
Hopefully, this Article will contribute to avoiding it.
